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Abstract
This paper examines career choices using a dynamic structural model that
nests a job search model within a human capital model of occupational and
educational choices. Individuals in the model decide when to attend school
and when to move between rms and occupations over the course of their ca-
reer. Workers search for suitable wage and non-pecuniary match values at rms
across occupations given their heterogeneous skill endowments and preferences
for employment in each occupation. Over the course of their careers workers
endogenously accumulate rm and occupation specic human capital that af-
fects wages di¤erently across occupations. The parameters of the model are
estimated with simulated maximum likelihood using data from the 1979 co-
hort of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth. The structural parameter
estimates reveal that both self-selection in occupational choices and mobility
between rms account for a much larger share of total earnings and utility than
the combined e¤ects of rm and occupation specic human capital. Eliminating
the gains from matching between workers and occupations would reduce total
wages by 31%, eliminating the gains from job search would reduce wages by
19%, and eliminating the e¤ects of rm and occupation specic human capital
on wages would reduce wages by only 2.8%.
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1 Introduction
Over the course of their careers people choose how much education to obtain, which occupations to
work in, and when to move between rms. Despite the interrelated nature of these choices, previous
research has generally examined educational and occupational choices separately from decisions
about job search. Empirical studies of occupational and educational choices are frequently based
on the framework of human capital models, which have taken the form of dynamic programming
models in recent work (Keane and Wolpin 1997, Lee 2005, Lee and Wolpin 2006). In these dynamic
human capital models workers endogenously accumulate education and occupation specic human
capital as they make optimal career choices, but all jobs are identical within an occupation. In
contrast to dynamic human capital models, an extensive job search literature has emphasized
the importance of job matching between workers and rms in determining wages while generally
abstracting away from both occupational choices and human capital accumulation.1
The goal of this research is to further the understanding of how people make decisions about
educational attainment and employment by estimating a dynamic structural model of career choices
that incorporates the key features of a job search model within a dynamic human capital model of
occupational and educational choices. The model allows workers to accumulate rm and occupation
specic human capital as they move between rms and occupations over their career. Estimating
the model provides direct evidence about the relative importance of human capital, job search,
and matching between workers and occupations in determining wages and total utility. The main
empirical conclusion that emerges from this analysis is that self selection in occupational choices
and mobility between rms are much more important determinants of total earnings and utility
than the combined e¤ects of rm and occupation specic human capital. The structural parameter
estimates are used to perform counterfactual simulation which reveal that eliminating the gains
1Berkovec and Stern (1991) and Wolpin (1992) develop search models that include rm specic capital but these
models do not incorporate occupational choices. McCall (1990) and Neal (1999) develop search models that incorpo-
rate occupations, but these models do not include human capital accumulation.
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from matching between workers and occupations would reduce total wages by 31%, eliminating the
gains from job search would reduce wages by 19%, and eliminating the combined e¤ects of rm
and occupation specic human capital on wages would reduce earnings by only 2.8%. Existing
research has been unable to determine the importance of each of these e¤ects because the typical
approaches to studying wage growth over the career examine the contributions of either human
capital accumulation or mobility in isolation, but do not attempt to jointly estimate the importance
of each facet of the career decision problem.
In the career choice model developed in this paper, forward looking workers choose when to
attend school and when to move between occupations and rms as they maximize their discounted
expected utility. Search frictions such as randomness in job o¤ers and moving costs impede the
optimal allocation of workers across occupations and rms. Over the course of their careers workers
endogenously accumulate general human capital in the form of education as well as occupation and
rm specic human capital. The value of employment varies over the ve occupations in the
economy because workers have heterogeneous skill endowments and preferences for employment
across occupations, and because the e¤ect of human capital on wages varies across occupations.
Workers search for suitable wage and non-pecuniary match values at rms across occupations given
their innate skills and preferences and stock of human capital. Allowing for search based on non-
pecuniary utility generalizes the approach used in many search models which assume that workers
search only for wage match values.2
This paper contributes to a growing literature that demonstrates the value of using dynamic
discrete choice models to study employment and educational choices over the career. Most relevant
to the work presented here are the dynamic human capital models developed by Keane and Wolpin
(1997, 2001) and dynamic structural models such as Eckstein and Wolpin (1999) and Belzil and
Hansen (2002) that focus on the endogenous accumulation of education. The model developed in
2See Blau (1991), Hwang, Mortensen, and Reed (1998), and Dey and Flinn (2005) for examples of search models
that incorporate non-pecuniary job characteristics.
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this paper expands on the occupational choice model of Keane and Wolpin (1997) by adding job
matching between workers and rms, rm specic human capital, heterogeneity in preferences for
employment in each occupation, and by expanding the number of civilian occupations from two to
ve. Incorporating the human capital occupational choice approach to career dynamics along with
the rm based job search approach within a unied model is necessary to determine the relative
importance of each aspect of the career decision problem in explaining career choices, wages, and
total utility.
The parameters of the structural model are estimated by simulated maximum likelihood using
data from the 1979 cohort of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY). The likelihood
function follows directly from the recursive numerical solution to each individuals dynamic pro-
gramming problem. The computational cost of estimation is substantial because simultaneously
modelling human capital accumulation, job search, and occupational choices creates a dynamic
programming problem that is challenging to solve. Estimation is made feasible by implementing an
interpolation method when solving the dynamic programming problem that modies the approach
developed by Keane and Wolpin (1994) in a way that takes advantage of the special structure of
this model.
The career choice model nests a human capital model of occupational choices and a job search
model, so the structural parameter estimates provide direct evidence about the relative importance
of rm and occupation specic human capital, job search, and heterogeneity in occupation spe-
cic skills and preferences in determining career choices, wages, and total utility. The parameter
estimates show that features of a dynamic human capital model and job search model are both
necessary to understand the evolution of wages and utility over the career. The potential percent
increase in wages caused by the acquisition of rm specic human capital ranges from 9.7% to 25.4%
across occupations, and the potential wage gains from occupation specic human capital range from
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essentially zero to 17% across occupations.3 The estimates of the e¤ects of human capital on wages
indicate that search models that do not incorporate human capital accumulation are missing an
important source of wage growth. The potential wage gains from job search are also quite large. A
worker who is able to move from a 25th percentile rm match to a 75th percentile match realizes
a 45% increase in wages. Occupational choice models set in a human capital framework where all
jobs are identical within occupations are missing a key determinant of wage growth.
The model is also used to determine the importance of permanent heterogeneity in skills and
preferences in determining lifetime utility relative to the importance of randomness in wage and
utility shocks, randomness in human capital improvement, and randomness in the arrival of rm-
specic job matches. The results indicate that 56% of the variation in lifetime utility is determined
by permanent heterogeneity. To provide some context for this result, Keane and Wolpin (1997) nd
that 90% of lifetime utility is determined by permanent heterogeneity in their career choice model
that does not consider the role of matching between workers and rms in determining wages and
utility. Allowing for matching between workers and rms, rm specic human capital, and random
shocks to non-pecuniary utility reduces the relative importance of permanent heterogeneity in
determining lifetime utility, but its impact is still substantial.
2 Data
The parameters of the model are estimated using the 1979 cohort of the National Longitudinal
Survey of Youth (NLSY). This data set includes detailed information about the educational and
employment experiences of a nationally representative sample of 12,686 men and women who were
14-21 years old when rst interviewed in 1979. The data provide a rich set of educational infor-
mation about each respondent, including dates of school attendance and dates of graduation and
3Estimating the return to rm tenure has been the subject of a large literature. See, for example, Altonji and
Shakotko (1987), Topel (1991), and Dustmann and Meghir (2005). Estimating the returns to occupation tenure has
received far less attention. See, for example, Kambourov and Manovskii (2006) for instrumental variables estimates
of the returns to occupation tenure.
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GED receipt. Employment data include the duration of every employment spell over the sample
period, along with the corresponding wages, hours, and occupation for each employment spell. This
information allows for the identication of transitions between employers and occupations, as well
as the patterns of wage changes over the career.
The NLSY consists of a nationally representative core sample, a military sample, and a supple-
mental sample that over-samples blacks, Hispanics, and economically disadvantaged whites. This
analysis uses only white men from the nationally representative core sample. Individuals who are
older than age sixteen in the rst year of the NLSY are not used. Individuals remain in the data
set up to age thirty or until the observation is truncated at the rst instance of missing information
about yearly labor force status or the occupation of a yearly job. Respondents are dropped from
the sample if they provide insu¢ cient information to construct a history of educational attainment.
Respondents are also dropped from the sample if they ever serve in the military or work as a farmer.
The nal sample consists of 1,023 men who remain in the sample for an average of 10.37 years,
resulting in 10,609 person yearsof data. The decision period in the model corresponds to a school
year, which runs from September to August.4 The data are aggregated using an approach similar
to that of Keane and Wolpin (1997) to assign yearly employment status and school attendance.
See Appendix A for a detailed description of the procedures used to aggregate the data.
The NLSY data provides information on occupational codes at the three digit level. The level
of detail provided in these codes raises questions about the proper denition of an occupation.
The human capital model presented in this paper suggests that an occupation should be dened
as a set of jobs that have common requirements in terms of skills and abilities. Based on this
denition, occupations should be dened in such a manner that within each group some portion
of an individuals occupation specic abilities and accumulated skills will be transferable across all
jobs that fall into the group. Another important consideration is that the cost of estimating the
4Yearly data are frequently used when estimating dynamic structural models. See, for example, Keane and Wolpin
(1997) or Belzil and Hansen (2002).
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Table 1 
Description of Aggregated Occupations 
Aggregated Occupations 
1970 Census 
Occupation 
Codes 
Example Occupations 
Professional, Technical, 
Managers 
001 - 245 Architects, Economists, Office Managers 
Craftsmen 401 - 580 Carpenters, Electricians, Automobile Mechanics 
Operatives & Non-farm Laborers 601 - 785 Butchers, Truck Drivers, Groundskeepers 
Sales & Clerical 260 - 395 Insurance Agents, Bank Tellers 
Service 901 - 984 Janitors, Dishwashers, Nursing Aides 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Choice Distribution by Age 
Age School 
Professional 
& Managers Craftsmen 
Operatives 
& laborers 
Sales & 
clerical Service Unemployed 
Total 
Observations 
16 85.7 1.4 2.2 10.9 2.9 7.6 10.4 1,023 
17 79.4 2.1 4.0 12.7 7.1 8.5 12.6 963 
18 48.3 2.8 6.8 16.9 8.0 8.5 21.4 893 
19 38.2 5.6 10.1 17.7 8.8 7.4 20.4 838 
20 33.3 8.9 14.3 17.4 7.8 7.4 19.7 798 
21 27.6 11.5 16.8 17.6 9.5 6.9 18.0 756 
22 16.4 17.5 17.5 18.6 13.9 6.2 16.4 714   
23 10.5 22.7 16.6 18.4 14.4 8.4 14.8 675 
24 8.3 26.1 20.1 18.6 12.9 7.6 10.5 641 
25 4.8 29.2 21.4 16.3 12.7 6.8 12.0 607 
26 5.8 32.6 19.7 18.3 11.7 7.1 8.7 589 
27 3.4 32.2 21.0 16.9 13.5 5.0 10.5 562 
28 5.0 35.8 19.4 15.5 11.2 5.4 10.6 536 
29 1.2 33.7 16.7 18.2 10.5 7.2 13.4 516 
30 1.0 34.5 19.5 17.9 11.4 6.6 9.4 498 
All   24.6       19.8 15.1 16.8 10.4 7.1 13.9 10,609 
Note:  Entries are percentages. Rows need not sum to 100% because school attendance and employment are not 
mutually exclusive. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
model increases substantially as the number of occupations increases, so using extremely detailed
occupational classications is not computationally feasible. Based on these considerations, occu-
pations are aggregated into the ve occupational groups listed in Table 1. Aggregating occupations
into ve groups is a lower level of aggregation than that found in existing research. Recent dynamic
structural models of occupational choices such as Keane and Wolpin (1997) and Lee (2005) have
aggregated the data into only two occupations (blue and white collar). Lee and Wolpin (2006)
model both sectoral and occupational choices by allowing workers to choose between blue, white,
and pink collar employment in both the service and goods sectors, but they do not model job search
decisions.
2.1 Descriptive Statistics
This section highlights the key characteristics of the data and provides descriptive statistics about
the career choices observed in the data. Table 2 shows the choice distribution by age. There are
1,023 people in the sample at age 16. This number declines fairly smoothly over time because some
observations are truncated at each age due to missing data. Approximately 86% of the sample
attends school at age 16. School attendance takes a discrete drop to 48% at age 18, the age where
most people have graduated from high school. As an alternative to high school graduation, 6.6%
of the sample reports earning a GED at some point over the sample period. School attendance
declines steadily throughout the college ages and then drops to approximately 16% at age 22, the
normal college graduation age. School attendance declines to 4.8% by age 25, and continues to
decline at more advanced ages. Keane and Wolpin (2001) report a qualitatively similar relationship
between age and schooling using less highly aggregated data that divides each school year into
three segments. As school attendance declines with age, the percentage of people employed as
professional and managerial workers steadily increases from 1.4% at age 16 to 34.5% at age 30.
In contrast, the percentage of people employed as service workers is relatively stable over time,
ranging between 5 and 8%.
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The percentage of people unemployed is 10% at age 16. Unemployment rises to approximately
20% at ages 18-21 before stabilizing at close to 10% at ages 24 and above. The large number of
people classied as unemployed is due to the denition of school attendance used to classify people
as attending school. Recall that a person must attend school and complete a grade to be coded as
attending school, so people who attend school and fail to complete a grade are classied as unem-
ployed. Additionally, a person who is unemployed for 27 weeks during a year and employed for 25
weeks is classied as unemployed, because his primary activity during the year was unemployment.
Keane and Wolpin (1997) report a similarly high rate of unemployment using slightly di¤erent
denitions of employment and school attendance.
Table 3 shows that there are di¤erences in the levels of inter-rm and intra-rm occupational
mobility. The relevant entries in each cell for this discussion are the top entries, which are com-
puted using the NLSY data.5 Mobility between occupations is more likely to occur when a person
switches rms than when the person does not switch rms. The age patterns in these two types
of occupational mobility are also quite di¤erent. Inter-rm occupational mobility declines by 29%
from the youngest age group to the oldest, while intra-rm occupational mobility declines by 41%.
The di¤erence in the age patterns between these two types of mobility suggests that opportunities
for intra-rm occupational switches may become less frequent with age.
Table 4 allows for a more detailed examination of mobility between occupations. Cell (i,j ) of this
table (where i represents the row and j represents the column) gives the percentage of employment
spells in occupation i that are followed by a spell in occupation j. For example, cell (2,1) indicates
that a person employed as a craftsman has a 7.25% chance of becoming a professional or managerial
worker in the next year, conditional on being employed in the next year. The diagonal elements
of the occupational transition matrix in Table 4 are fairly large, indicating a substantial amount
of persistence in occupational choices. However, even at this relatively high level of aggregation
5The bottom entries in the cells in Tables 3 and 4 are computed using simulated data generated from the estimated
structural model. These entries will be discussed in detail later in the paper.
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Table 3 
Summary of Occupational Mobility by Age: NLSY Data (top entry) and Simulated Data 
(bottom entry) 
Ages Conditional on Switching 
Firms, % Switching 
Occupations 
Conditional on not Switching 
Firms, % Switching 
Occupations 
16-21 57.64% 
                  54.40% 
29.94% 
27.38% 
22-25 50.09% 
47.14% 
26.85% 
23.39% 
26-30 40.76% 
37.86% 
17.61% 
14.83% 
All Ages 49.78% 
46.56% 
24.69% 
21.75% 
Note: Probabilities are computed using all consecutive years of employment observed in the data for each 
age group. The top entry of each cell is computed using the NLSY data, and the bottom entry is computed 
using simulated data generated using the estimated structural model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 
Occupational Transition Matrix: NLSY Data (top entry) and Simulated Data (bottom 
entry) 
 Professional & 
Managers 
Craftsmen Operatives & 
Laborers 
Sales & 
Clerical 
Service 
Professional & 
Managers 
83.28 
86.10 
4.22 
2.84 
3.00 
2.48 
7.35 
6.61 
2.15 
1.97 
Craftsmen 7.25 
5.40 
75.59 
77.54 
13.05 
12.15 
2.55 
4.36 
1.57 
.55 
Operatives & 
Laborers 
4.74 
4.73 
14.90 
13.53 
68.98 
71.24 
7.66 
7.52 
3.71 
2.98 
Sales & Clerical 20.45 
17.31 
4.60 
6.01 
10.76 
8.87 
61.94 
 65.36 
2.25 
2.45 
Service 10.53 
8.82 
7.22 
7.01 
9.32 
8.05 
4.51 
6.23 
68.42 
69.89 
Note: The entries in this table are transition probabilities from the occupation in the left column to the occupation 
in the top row. The top entry of each cell is computed using the NLSY data, and the bottom entry is computed 
using simulated data generated using the estimated structural model. 
 
 
 
 
 
there is a substantial amount of occupational mobility. The diagonal elements show that people
employed as professional and managerial workers are least likely to switch occupations, while sales
and clerical workers are most likely to switch occupations.
Overall, the transition matrix is fairly symmetric, with the exception of the ows of workers
between the sales and clerical and service occupations to professional and managerial employment.
Workers are much more likely to switch from sales and clerical or service employment to professional
and managerial jobs than in the opposite direction. The largest ow of workers between occupations
occurs from sales and clerical to professional and managerial employment.
3 Economic Model of Career Choices
Each individuals career is modeled as a nite horizon, discrete time dynamic programming prob-
lem. In each year, individuals maximize the discounted sum of expected utility by choosing between
working in one of the ve occupations in the economy, attending school, earning a GED, or be-
ing unemployed. Workers search for suitable wage and non-wage match values across rms while
employed and non-employed given their skills and preferences for employment in each occupation.
Dual activities such as simultaneously working and attending school are also feasible choices. The
exact set of choices available in year t depends in part on the labor force state occupied in the pre-
vious year. Each period, an individual always receives one job o¤er from a rm in each occupation
and has the option of attending school, earning a GED, or becoming unemployed. In addition,
people who are employed have the option of staying at their current job during the next year and
may also have the option of switching occupations within their current rm. While employed, a
worker receives either zero or one opportunity to switch occupations at his current rm.6 Indi-
viduals observe all the components of the pecuniary and non-pecuniary rewards associated with
each feasible choice in each decision period and then select the choice that provides the highest
6Many models of labor mobility ignore the possibility that workers may switch occupations within a rm. Analysis
of the NLSY data presented in Section 2 suggests that that a signicant fraction of workers switch occupations without
switching rms.
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discounted expected utility.
Human capital enters the model through the endogenous accumulation of both rm and occu-
pation specic work experience and education, which a¤ect wages and non-pecuniary utility ows.
Thus, workers choose to accumulate schooling, which is costly, in order to obtain higher utility in
the future. Jobs are also partly investment goods in the model because forward looking workers
realize that work experience a¤ects the distributions of wage o¤ers and non-pecuniary benets that
they face.
3.1 Utility Function
The utility function is a choice specic function of endogenous state variables (St), skill endowments
and preferences, and random utility shocks that vary over time, people, occupations, and rm
matches. The variables in St measure educational attainment, rm and occupation specic human
capital, and the quality of the match between a worker and rm. To index choices for the non-work
alternatives, let s = school, g = GED and u = unemployed.7 Describing working alternatives
requires two indexes. Let eq = employed in occupation q, where q = 1; :::; 5 indexes occupations.
Also, let nf =working at a new rm, and of =working at an old rm.Combinations of these
indexes dene all the feasible choices available to an individual. The description of the utility
ows is simplied by dening another index that indicates whether or not a person is employed,
so let emp =employed. Dene the binary variable dt(k) = 1 if choice combination k is chosen at
time t, where k is a vector that contains a feasible combination of the choice indexes. For example,
dt(s) = 1 indicates that schooling is chosen at time t, and dt(s; e3; nf) = 1 indicates attending school
(s) while employed in the third occupation (e3) at a new rm (nf). Dual activities composed of
combinations of any two activities are allowed subject to the logical restrictions outlined in Section
3.1.2.
7There is no uncertainty in the receipt of a GED in the model. If an individual decides to earn a GED, he receives
one. In reality, people must pass a test to earn a GED. Tyler et al (2000) report that roughly 70% of people pass the
GED exam on the rst try. Within two years the eventual pass rate is 85%.
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3.1.1 Choice Specic Utility Flows
This section outlines the utility ows corresponding to each possible choice. The utility ow from
choice combination k is the sum of the logarithm of the wage, wit(k), and non-pecuniary utility,
Hit(k), that person i receives from choice combination k at time t,
Uit(k) = wit(k) +Hit(k): (1)
The remainder of this section describes the structure of the wage and non-pecuniary utility ows
in more detail.
3.1.1a Wages. The log-wage of worker i employed at rm j in occupation q at time t is
wit = wq(Sit) + 
q
i +  ij + eijt: (2)
The term wq(Sit) represents the portion of the log wage that is a deterministic function of the work
experience and education variables in the state vector. The occupation specic subscript q allows
the parameters of the wage equation to vary over occupations. For example, the e¤ect of education
on wages may di¤er by occupation. The term qi represents the random component of worker is
wages that is common across all rms in occupation q. This term allows people to have comparative
advantages in their occupation specic skill endowments. The permanent worker-rm productivity
match is represented by  ij . This term reects match specic factors that are unobserved by the
econometrician and a¤ect the wage of worker i at rm j. True randomness in wages is captured
by eijt. All of the components of the wage (wit) are observed by the worker when a job o¤er is
received.
3.1.1b Non-pecuniary Utility Flows. Non-pecuniary utility ows are composed of a determin-
istic function of the state vector, rm specic match values, person specic preference heterogeneity,
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and random utility shocks. Dene 1fg as the indicator function which is equal to one if its argu-
ment is true and equal to zero otherwise. The non-pecuniary utility ow equation is
Hit(k) = [h(k; Sit)] +
h
si1fs 2 kg+ ui 1fu 2 kg+
P5
q=1 
q
i 1feq 2 kg
i
(3)
+"ikt:
The rst term in brackets represents the inuence of the state vector on non-pecuniary utility ows
and is discussed in more detail in the following paragraph. The second term in brackets captures
the e¤ect of person specic heterogeneity in preferences for attending school (si ), being unemployed
(ui ), and being employed in occupation q (
q
i ). The non-pecuniary occupation match value, 
q
i ,
represents the random component of person is preference for working in occupation q. This term
captures variation in the value that people place on job attributes such as the physical or mental
demands of a job or the risk of injury that is common across jobs in each occupation. Stinebrickner
(2001) shows that preference heterogeneity is an important determinant of occupational choices
at the narrow level of choosing between a teaching or non-teaching job. However, this type of
heterogeneity in preferences has not been extended to broader models of occupational choice. The
term si allows for heterogeneity in the cost of schooling caused by unobserved traits such as ability
or motivation that may alter the utility cost of attending school. The nal term, "ikt, is a shock to
the non-pecuniary utility that person i receives from choice combination k at time t.
The remaining portion of the non-pecuniary utility function contains the non-pecuniary em-
ployment and non-employment utility ows along with the schooling cost function. This utility
ow equation is specied as
h(k; Sit) =
hP5
q=1 q(Sit)1feq 2 kg+ ij1femp 2 kg
i
(4)
+Cs(Sit)1fs 2 k; emp =2 kg+ Csw(Sit)1fs 2 k; emp 2 kg
+b(Sit)1fu 2 kg+ Cg(Sit)1fg 2 kg:
The term in brackets contains the occupation and rm specic non-pecuniary utility ows. The
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occupation specic portion of this ow, q(Sit), is a function of the state vector that is allowed to
vary over occupations. This specication allows the e¤ect of state variables such as education on
employment utility to vary by occupation. The rm specic non-pecuniary match value for person
i at rm j is represented by ij . This match value reects the inuence of permanent attributes
of employment at each rm that a¤ect the employment utility ow and are not observed by the
econometrician. For example, job attributes such as commuting distance, relationships with co-
workers, and availability of fringe benets may all a¤ect the value of a job, and their value may
di¤er across people. Non-wage matching of this type has not been incorporated in previous models
of occupational choice. The second line of equation 4 contains the schooling cost function. There
are two schooling cost functions, one for attending school while not employed, Cs(Sit), and one for
attending school while working at the same time, Csw(Sit). The two schooling cost functions allow
for the possibility that attending school is more costly while employed. The nal components of
the non-pecuniary utility ow are the deterministic portions of the value of leisure enjoyed while
unemployed, b(Sit), and the cost function for earning a GED, Cg(Sit).
3.1.2 Constraints on the Choice Set
The structural modeling approach requires a detailed specication of the labor market constraints
that determine an individuals choice set in each year. First, consider the case of an individual who
enters time period t having not been employed in the previous year. At the start of the year the
individual receives ve job o¤ers, one from a rm in each of the ve occupations in the economy.
Recall that a job o¤er consists of the wage and non-pecuniary value that the worker places on the
job. The individual also observes all components of the rewards associated with attending school,
earning a GED, being unemployed, and all feasible combinations of these choices.8
8 In this model workers always have the option of returning to their current job, although the o¤ered wage will
change because each job receives a new random shock in each year (eijt). Thus, transitions into unemployment
are utility maximizing responses to shocks. This framework is adopted in many papers such as Berkovec and Stern
(1991), Keane and Wolpin (1997), and Lee and Wolpin (2005). An alternative framework allows for a job destruction
(layo¤) probability and allows workers to always stay at the existing job at the previous wage. Given the available
data these two models are observationally equivalent, see Eckstein and van den Berg (2006) for a detailed discussion.
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Any dual activity is a feasible choice, subject to the following restrictions. Earning a GED
must be part of a joint activity, so the single activity dt(g) = 1 is not a feasible choice. In addition,
earning a GED is dropped from the choice set after high school graduation or GED receipt. Finally,
unemployment and employment are mutually exclusive choices. Given these restrictions, the choice
set for individuals who are not employed when they enter period t is
Dnet = f[dt(s); dt(u); dt(u; g)]; [dt(ei; nf); i = 1; :::; 5]; (5)
[dt(q; ei; nf); q = s; g; i = 1; :::; 5]g:
The rst three terms correspond to the feasible non-employment opportunities, the next ve terms
correspond to employment in each of the ve occupations, and the nal ten terms are the feasible
combinations of employment and education.
Next, consider the feasible choices for a person employed in occupation q: At the start of period
t the individual receives one new job o¤er from a rm in each of the ve occupations and has the
option to attend school, earn a GED, or become unemployed. In addition, an employed individual
always has the option of remaining at his current rm and staying in his current occupation (q).
Job o¤ers from new occupations at the current rm are received randomly, where workers receive
either zero or one such o¤er per year. Let j denote the probability that a worker receives an o¤er
to work in occupation j at his current rm, where j 6= q. Let nq be the probability that a worker
employed in occupation q does not receive an o¤er to switch occupations within his current rm.
This structure implies that in each period a worker always has the option of switching occupations
if he switches rms, but mobility between occupations within a rm is restricted by the receipt of
job o¤ers. This feature of the model is intended to capture the fact that the scope for mobility
between occupations within a rm is likely to be more limited than opportunities for mobility into
new occupations when a person also switches rms.
Within-rm occupation switch o¤er probabilities are identied by functional form assumptions
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and the transition rates between occupations observed in the data. The model imposes the re-
striction that the distribution of the random components of job o¤ers is the same for internal and
external job o¤ers. Given this restriction, within-rm occupation switch job o¤er probabilities are
identied by the fact that in the data, within-rm occupational switches are observed less frequently
than transitions between occupations when a person moves to a new rm.9
The choice set for a worker employed in occupation q who receives an o¤er to switch to occu-
pation j at his current rm is
Det (j) = fDnet ; [dt(eq; of); dt(s; eq; of); dt(g; eq; of)]; [dt(ej; of); dt(s; ej; of); dt(g; ej; of)]g: (6)
If an o¤er to switch occupations within the current rm is not received, then the nal three choices
are not available to the agent. Let Det (0) denote this twenty-one element choice set.
3.1.3 State Variables
The endogenous state variables in the vector St measure human capital and the quality of the
match between the worker and his current employer. Educational attainment is summarized by
the number of years of high school and college completed, hst and colt, and a dummy variable
indicating whether or not a GED has been earned, gedt: Possible values of completed years of high
school range from 0 to 4, and the possible values of completed college range from 0 to 5, where ve
years of completed college represents graduate school. Work experience is captured by the amount
of rm specic human capital (fct) and occupation specic human capital (oct) in the occupation
that the person worked in most recently. Let Ot 2 [1; 2; :::; 5] indicate the occupation in which a
person was most recently employed. Let Lt be a variable that indicates a persons previous choice,
where Lt = f1; :::; 5g refers to working in occupations one through ve, Lt = 6 indicates attending
school full time, and Lt = 7 indicates unemployment.
Given this notation, the state vector is St = fhst; colt; gedt; fct; oct;Ot; Lt; t;  tg: Including
9See Canals and Stern (2002) for a discussion of a similar identication issue that arises in a simple search model.
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both rm and occupation specic human capital as state variables causes problems because the
size of the state space quickly becomes intractably large due to the fact that the model incorporates
job search, occupational choices, and educational choices. In order to keep the model tractable,
only human capital in the most recent occupation is included in the state space even though this
requires a strong assumption about the transferability of human capital across occupations and the
depreciation of human capital.10 However, age e¤ects are included in the wage equations to proxy
for general human capital that has value in more than one occupation.
In addition to assuming that only human capital in the most recent occupation a¤ects wages,
a second approach is taken to further reduce the size of the state space. Assume that rm and
occupation specic human capital each take on P values, so that the possible values of human
capital arranged in ascending order are
fct 2 FC = ffc(1);:::; fc(P )g
oct 2 OC = foc(1);:::; oc(P )g:
After each year of work experience, with probability  human capital increases to the next level,
and with probability (1   ) human capital does not increase.11 There are separate skill increase
probabilities for rm and occupation specic capital, and the rates of skill increase are also allowed
to vary across occupations. The skill increase parameters are fkf ; ko ; k = 1; :::; 5g, where the
subscripts f and o refer to rm and occupation specic capital, and k indexes occupations. The
human capital transition probabilities (s) are known by agents in the model. Upon entering a
new occupation, oct is reset to the rst level. Similarly, fct starts at the rst level in the rst year
10 Ideally, one would allow for cross-occupation experience e¤ects in the wage equation, which would require adding
measures of previous occupation specic human capital to the state space. Unfortunately, allowing for these e¤ects
would render an already extremely computationally demanding estimation problem completely infeasable given cur-
rent computer technology. Due to the size of the state space, along with the large number of parameters in the model,
estimating the model presented in this paper is only possible using interpolation methods and parallel processing
techniques. Given these considerable di¢ culties, I leave the inclusion of cross-occupation experience e¤ects as an
extension for future research. However, I provide some evidence regarding their importance in the Section 5.2.1,
Wage Equation Specication Tests.
11Brown and Flinn (2004) use a similar method to model the process by which child quality changes over time.
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of employment at a rm. The size of the state space is signicantly reduced when P is a small
number relative to the possible values of years of work experience, but the model still captures the
human capital improvement process. In this work, P = 3. Sections 5.1 and 5.2 present evidence
that the discrete approach to modelling human capital provides parameter estimates that t the
observed patterns in wage growth in the NLSY extremely well.
This method of modelling human capital has the advantage of making it possible to include both
rm and occupation specic human capital in the state space at a fraction of the cost of keeping
track of actual years of experience at a rm or in an occupation, because work experience could
range from zero to fteen years in this model. In models of this type with large state spaces, an
alternative approach would be to place relatively low upper bounds on state variables, or omit some
of them entirely. The approach presented here is appealing from a practical standpoint because it
makes estimation feasible, but it is also consistent with the theory of human capital. The number
of years of completed work experience is generally included as an explanatory variable in wage
regressions only as a proxy for the unobservable level of human capital that actually a¤ects wages.
Viewing increases in human capital as a stochastic event is consistent with this idea, because it
allows for the possibility that years of work experience may vary for people with a given level of
human capital.
3.2 The Optimization Problem
Individuals maximize the present discounted value of expected lifetime utility from age 16 (t = 1)
to a known terminal age, t = T . At the start of his career, the individual knows the human
capital wage function in each occupation, as well as the deterministic components of the utility
function. An individual also knows his endowment of market skills (s) and occupation specic
non-pecuniary match values (s). Future realizations of rm specic match values ( s and s)
and time and choice specic utility shocks ("s and es) are unknown. Although future values are
unknown, individuals know the distributions of these random components. Individuals also know
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the current values of all variables in the state vector, St, as well as the probability that human
capital will increase in the next period, conditional on employment (kf ; 
k
o ; k = 1; :::; 5).
The maximization problem can be represented in terms of alternative specic value functions
which give the lifetime discounted expected value of each choice for a given set of state variables, St.
The employed and non-employed value functions are structured di¤erently because the employed
value function must incorporate the value of internal job o¤ers. The value function and utility
ow equations are functions of the state vector, St, but this argument is suppressed for brevity of
notation.
The value function for an individual with discount factor  employed in occupation q is the
utility ow from employment, plus the discounted expected value of the best choice available next
period,
Vt(eq; l) = Ut(eq; l) + 
X
k 6=q
kEZ
ek
t + [nqEZ
eq
t ]; q = 1; :::; 5; l = of; nf: (7)
The EZekt terms represent the expected value of the best choice in period t+1, conditional on receipt
of an o¤er to work in occupation k at the workers current rm. The expectations are taken over
the random components of the choice specic utility ows, which are the random utility shocks and
match values, f"; e;  ; g. The expectation is also taken over rm and occupation specic human
capital, (fc and oc) since human capital evolves stochastically.12
Consider the rst summation in equation 7. Each term in the sum corresponds to the probability
that a job o¤er to work in a new occupation at the current rm is received (so k 6= q), multiplied
by the corresponding expected value of the best option next period. For each occupation q it must
be the case that
P
j 6=q j + nq = 1: The structure of the value function is similar to the model
presented by Wolpin (1992) in that both models allow the arrival of some types of job o¤ers to be
random, which implies that the values of future choices must be weighted by job o¤er probabilities.
12See Rust and Phelan (1997) for an example of another dynamic programming model where agents face uncertainty
about how the state vector will evolve over time.
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Wolpin (1992) estimates job o¤er probabilities for unemployed and employed job searchers, in
contrast to the intra-rm job o¤er probabilities estimated in the present model.
The individual elements of the EZekt terms are the time t+ 1 value functions for each feasible
choice,
EZekt = Emax fVt+1(s); Vt+1(u); Vt+1(u; g); [Vt+1(ei; nf); Vt+1(m; ei; nf);
m = s; g; i = 1; :::; 5; ]; Vt+1(eq; of); Vt+1(s; eq; of); Vt+1(g; eq; of);
Vt+1(ek; of); Vt+1(s; ek; of); Vt+1(g; ek; of)g : (8)
In the remainder of the paper, I will refer to these expected values as Emax. The nal term in
the employed value function corresponds to the case where an individual does not receive an o¤er to
switch occupations within his current rm. In this case, switching occupations without switching
rms is not possible, so the expected value of the best choice at time t+ 1 is
EZeqt = EmaxfVt+1(s); Vt+1(u); Vt+1(u; g); (9)
[Vt+1(ei; nf); Vt+1(m; ei; nf);m = s; g; i = 1; :::; 5];
Vt+1(eq; of); Vt+1(s; eq; of); Vt+1(g; eq; of)g:
The value function for an individual who is not currently employed is simpler because mobility
within a rm is obviously not possible for people who are not employed. The value function is
Vt(p) = Ut(p) + EZ
su
t ; p = fsg; fug; fu; gg (10)
The corresponding expected value of the maximum term is
EZsut = Emax fVt+1(s); Vt+1(u); Vt+1(u; g); (11)
Vt+1(ei; nf); Vt+1(m; ei; nf); m = s; g; i = 1; :::; 5g ;
which consists of all feasible combinations of schooling, unemployment, and new job o¤ers.
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Agents making career decisions use the value functions to determine the optimal educational
and employment choices in each period. Each period, a person observes all of the components of
the utility ows of each feasible choice, and then calculates the value of each choice using equations
7 through 11. He then chooses the option with the highest discounted expected value.13
3.3 Solving the Career Decision Problem
Estimating the structural parameters of the model requires solving the optimization problem faced
by agents in the model. The nite horizon dynamic programming problem is solved by backwards
recursion. Assume that there is some age, T , after which no choices are made, and another age, T 
at which the agent dies. Then, evaluating the value functions from T  to T  is straightforward,
because the value function for each choice is simply a sum of one period expected utility ows.
Given the value functions at age T ; the value functions can be solved backwards recursively for all
t < T  using equations 7 through 11. Before considering the solution of the model in more detail,
it is useful to specify the distributions of the random components of utility ows.
3.3.1 Distributional Assumptions
Assume that rm specic match values and randomness in wages are distributed i.i.d normal:
ij v N(0; 2),  ij v N(0; 2 ), and eijt v N(0; 2e). The rm specic pecuniary and non-
pecuniary match values are part of the state space because the value function associated with a
job depends on the wage match value ( ij) and non-wage match value (ij) for worker i at rm j.
The distributions of these variables are continuous, which causes a problem because the state space
becomes innitely large when continuous variables are included. This problem is solved by using a
discrete approximation to the distributions of wage match values ( ij) and non-wage match values
(ij) when solving the value functions and computing the likelihood function.
13Pavan (2006) estimates a model of career choices that focuses on modeling mobility at the very disaggregated
level of three-digit occupations and industries. In contrast, the model developed in this paper uses much more highly
aggregated occupation groups, but allows for endogenous educational attainment and heterogeneous human capital
e¤ects across occupations.
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Assume that the random choice-specic utility shocks are distributed extreme value, with dis-
tribution function F (") = expf  exp(  " )g, and with variance 22=6: The assumption that the "s
are distributed extreme value simplies the computation of the value functions and choice proba-
bilities.
It remains to specify the distributions of the occupation specic skill endowments (s) and
preferences (s). Using an approach similar to Heckman and Singer (1984), Keane and Wolpin
(1997), and Stinebrickner (2001), the joint distribution of skill endowments and preferences is
specied as a discrete multinomial distribution. Let i = f1i ; :::; 5i ; 1i ; :::; 5i ; si ; ui g be the vector
of skill endowments and preferences that are known to the agent at age sixteen.
Assume that there are M types of people, each with a di¤erent endowment of skills and pref-
erences, fm;m = 1; :::;Mg. Dene m(hs(age = 16)) as the proportion of the mth type in the
population, where the argument hs(age = 16) indicates that the type probabilities are conditioned
on the number of years of high school that an individual has completed as of age 16. Following
Keane and Wolpin (1997) type probabilities are allowed to vary between individuals who have not
completed the 10th grade by age 16 and those who have complete at least the 10th grade by age
16. Endowment heterogeneity is unobserved to the econometrician, but assume that we do know
that there are M types of people. This exible assumption about the joint distribution of skills
and preferences allows for a wide range of patterns of comparative advantages in skills and het-
erogeneity in preferences. As the number of types of people, M , becomes large, this approach can
approximate any joint distribution of skills and preferences arbitrarily well.
3.3.2 Calculating the Value Functions
The major complication arises from the fact that as the model is specied the Emax integrals do not
have closed form solutions. In many dynamic programming models, researchers assume that the
only randomness in utility ows is choice specic, independent over time, and distributed extreme
value. A consequence of this assumption is that the Emax integrals have a simple closed form.
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However, the unappealing consequence of this assumption in this application is that it rules out
job matching, which is the basis of the standard job search model.
This paper employs an interpolation algorithm that builds on the one developed by Keane and
Wolpin (1994). As in Keane and Wolpin (1994), value functions are simulated at a fraction of the
state space and interpolated using a regression at the remaining points in the state space. This
paper implements a new regression function that takes advantage of the assumption that the error
term " is distributed extreme value. This regression function has the desirable theoretical property
that it converges to the exact solution for Emax as ;  ; and e approach 0. In addition, it also
satises the theoretical restrictions on the Emax function outlined in McFadden (1981). Another
important property of this regression function is that the regressor is dened at every point in the
state space even if the set of feasible state points varies over the state space, as it does in this
model. In contrast, the regression function proposed by Keane and Wolpin (1994) uses the value
functions corresponding to each element in the choice set separately as regressors, which creates a
missing data problem when the choice set is state dependant.14 The details of the simulation and
interpolation solution method are presented in Appendix B.
4 Estimation of The Structural Model
The parameters of the model are estimated by simulated maximum likelihood (SML) using the
career history data from the NLSY. This section begins by specifying functional forms for the
utility ow equations.
4.1 Further Model Specication
Before discussing the details of estimating the parameters of the structural model, it remains to
specify the wage equations, non-pecuniary utility ow equations, and job o¤er probabilities in more
14One solution to this problem would be to use a di¤erent interpolating regression for each feasible choice set in
the state space. Depending on the exact details of the model, this approach has two potential drawbacks: 1) small
sample sizes in each individual regression, 2) the need to estimate a large number of interpolating regressions.
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detail.
4.1.1 Wage and Utility Flow Equations
This section denes the deterministic portion of the utility function. The deterministic portion of
the occupation specic human capital wage function is
wq(Sit) = 
q
1ageit + 
q
2age
2
it=100 + 
q
3hsit + 
q
4colit + 
q
51[ageit  17]+ (12)
q61[ageit  18 \ ageit  21] + q7gedit
+q81[fcit = fc(1)] + 
q
91[fcit = fc(2)] + 
q
101[fcit = fc(3)]
+q111[ocit = oc(1)] + 
q
121[ocit = oc(2)] + 
q
131[ocit = oc(3)]:
The parameters q8 and 
q
11 are xed at zero since they are not separately identied from the
constant in the wage equation.
Let NFt be a dummy variable indicating whether or not the individual is in his rst year of
employment at a rm after being employed at a di¤erent rm in the previous period. Let hdt
and cdt represent dummy variables that indicate receipt of a high school or college diploma. The
non-pecuniary utility ow equation for occupation q is
q(Sit) = 
q
1ageit + 
q
2age
2
it=100 + 
q
3(hsit + colit) + 
q
4ocit + 
q
5fcit + 
q
6hdit (13)
+q7cdit + 
q
8gedit + 
q
91[Lit > 5] + 
q
10NFit q = 1; :::; 5:
The inclusion of explanatory variables in the employment non-pecuniary employment ow equa-
tions allows observable variables to have a direct impact on employment utility in addition to any
e¤ect that they may have on wages. For example, as people age it may be the case that physi-
cally demanding occupations become less desirable relative to white collar employment. The cost
22
function for attending school is
cS(Sit) = s1ageit + s2age
2
it=100 + s3hdit + s4cdit + s5hsit + s6colit + s71[Lit 6= 6]
cSW (Sit) = sw1ageit + sw2age
2
it=100 + sw3hsit + sw4colit + s71[Lit 6= 6]
+sw6(hsit  4) + sw7(hsit = 4 \ colit  4) + sw8(colit  4): (14)
The data do not contain information about the monetary cost of attending school, so it is not
possible to separately identify the pecuniary and non-pecuniary cost of attending school. This
implies that the schooling utility ow represents the non-pecuniary benet of attending school
minus the pecuniary and non-pecuniary costs. The deterministic portion of the unemployment
utility ow, b(Sit), is set equal to zero because the non-wage utility ow coe¢ cients are only
identied relative to a base choice, as in any discrete choice model.15
The nal utility ow equation represents the utility derived from earning a GED. The deter-
ministic portion of the GED utility ow is
cg(Sit) = g1 + g2ageit. (15)
Within-rm job o¤er probabilities are specied as multinomial logit, so the probability of receiving
a job o¤er from occupation j at the current rm is
j =
exp(j)P5
k=1 exp(k)
: (16)
Finally, the discount factor, , is set equal to :95 rather than estimated because it can be di¢ cult
to estimate the discount factor in dynamic models, even though it is technically identied.16
15The specication of the schooling utility ow equation is based closely on Keane and Wolpin (1997). One of
Keane and Wolpins (1997) major ndings is that a bare bones" dynamic human capital model that excludes age
e¤ects and re-entry costs from the schooling utility ow equation is unable to match the rapid decine in schooling
with age. Including direct age e¤ects of this sort has become standard in the dynamic human capital literature. In
addition, it seems reasonable to believe that the e¤ort cost of schooling (or non-pecuniary consumption value) varies
with age.
16See Berkovec and Stern (1991) for an example of a model where it was not possible to estimate the discount
factor. Rust and Phelan (1997) nd that the likelihood function for their dynamic retirement model is very at as a
function of the discount factor, so they estimate the discount factor using a grid search. Keane and Wolpin (1997)
are able to estimate a yearly discount factor, their estimate is .936.
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4.2 The Likelihood Function
The likelihood function used to estimate the structural model follows directly from the model
presented in Section 3. The solution to the dynamic programming problem provides the choice
specic value functions which are used in the construction of the likelihood function. The vector of
parameters, denoted by , is made up of the parameters found in the deterministic portions of the
choice-specic utility ows, error standard deviations, job o¤er probabilities, and skill endowment
vectors and type probabilities. Dene Oit as the observed outcome for person i at time t, which
consists of an observed choice and possibly an observed wage. The likelihood contribution for
person i at time t is simply the joint probability of the choice made by the person and the wage, if
one is observed.
Conditional on having an endowment vector of type k, the likelihood contribution for person i
is the product of the probability of each outcome observed in the data over the eTi years that the
person remains in the sample,
Li( j i = k) =
Z
  
Z
[
Z Z 0@ eTiY
t=1
Pr[Oit j; Sit;i = k)
1A (17)
dF (oc)dF (fc)]dF (
):
Note that the path probability for each person is integrated over the distributions of occupation
and rm specic human capital (oc and fc) because these variables are unobserved. The likelihood
contribution is also integrated over the joint distribution of 
 = f ; ; eg, because these match
values and choice specic utility shocks are not observed.
The high dimensional integrals in the likelihood function are approximated using simulation
methods. The details of the simulation algorithm along with a derivation of the outcome prob-
abilities are provided in Appendix C. Let LSi ( j i = m) represent the simulated type-specic
likelihood contribution for person i. The simulated likelihood function for the sample is the product
over the N people in the sample of a weighted average of the type-specic simulated likelihoods,
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where the weights are the type probabilities,
LS( ) =
NY
i=1
MX
m=1
mL
S
i ( j i = m): (18)
The vector of parameters b that maximizes equation number 18 is the simulated maximum likeli-
hood estimate of .
Standard errors are computed using a parametric bootstrap estimator of the covariance matrix of
b. This approach to estimating standard errors has been successfully applied in complex structural
models such as the one estimated by Engers and Stern (2002). The bootstrapped standard errors are
computed by using the parameter estimates b to simulate R samples of data, and then re-estimating
b using each simulated sample. The parameter estimates from the R simulated samples are used
to construct an estimate of the variance of the parameter vector. This procedure is extremely
computer intensive because the model has nearly 200 parameters that must be re-estimated for
each simulated sample. Also, recall that each likelihood evaluation is quite expensive because
it involves solving the dynamic programming problem. Given these considerations, the standard
errors are estimated using R = 35 simulated datasets.17
4.3 Identication
Although the career choice model is fairly complex and contains a large number of parameters it
is still fairly straightforward to provide some intuition for how the parameters of the model are
identied. The goal of estimation is to estimate the parameters of occupation specic wage o¤er
equations along with parameters of non-pecuniary utility ow equations. It is useful to frame
the discussion of the identication of the wage equation parameters in terms of a sample selection
problem. The data contain information about an individuals wages and occupational choices, but of
17The computational burden of the parametric bootstrap may be lessened by taking k steps of a derivative based
optimization routine when estimating  for each simulated sample instead of allowing the optimization routine to
continue until convergence in each sample. In this work, experimentation showed that k = 4 provides a very close
approximation to the value of b that would be obtained if the number of optimization steps was not restricted: See
Davidson and MacKinnon (1999) for a detailed discussion of this k step parametric bootstrap.
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course wages are only observed for an individuals chosen occupation. The solution to the agents
optimization problem provides the sample selection rules that are used to estimate a selection
corrected wage equation for each occupation. The obvious analogy is to static selection models that
are estimated by maximum likelihood or by two-step procedures, and the major di¤erence between
the static and dynamic models is that the selection rules in the dynamic model are provided by the
numerical solution of the agents optimization problem.
Identication of the parameters of the non-pecuniary utility ow equations follows from the fact
that the data contain information about discrete career choices along with wages. The intuitive
explanation is that it is possible to estimate the e¤ects of observable variables on non-pecuniary
utility because the data provide information about the extent to which individualscareer choices
are not completely explained by variation in wages across occupations. To the extent that observed
variables are correlated with observed choices after conditioning on wages, this provides information
about the impact of the observed variables on non-pecuniary utility. For example, if college educated
workers work as professionals more often then one would expect solely based on occupational wage
di¤erentials, this suggests that the professional non-pecuniary utility ow is increasing in years of
completed education.
5 Structural Parameter Estimates
Table 7, Panels A-D present the structural parameter estimates and the associated standard errors.
This section discusses selected parameter estimates and their implications for the career decision
process.
5.1 Model Fit
Before discussing the parameter estimates it is useful to consider how well the model is able to
match the patterns found in the NLSY career choice and wage data. The structural parameter
estimates are used to simulate a sample of 4; 000 individuals whose career choices and wages are
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Table 5: Wage Distribution: Actual & Simulated Data 
Variable Professional 
& Managers 
Craftsmen Operatives & 
Laborers 
Sales & 
Clerical 
Service 
Mean wage: NLSY data 9.78 9.58 9.37 9.51 9.25 
Mean wage: simulated data 9.78 9.59 9.38 9.54 9.33 
Wage std dev: NLSY data .535 .453 .453 .507 .473 
Wage std dev: simulated data .514 .475 .446 .497 .471 
Note: Simulated wages computed from a sample of 4,000 people. Yearly wages are in logs. 
 
Table 6: χ2 Goodness-of-Fit Test Statistics 
Age School 
Professional 
& Managers Craftsmen 
Operatives 
& laborers 
Sales & 
clerical Service Unemployed 
16 1.54 51.15 65.76 72.90 8.23 18.34 7.22 
17 13.04 30.82 24.20 22.31 4.70 0.00 40.45 
18 3.77 25.00 4.59 17.40 26.93 0.09 0.08 
19 14.08 30.17 7.38 1.73 0.29 13.68 0.64 
20 0.47 48.55 10.03 0.87 20.75 32.18 0.07 
21 0.28 24.80 9.15 7.88 17.16 49.91 3.78 
22 1.60 10.23 2.61 6.32 28.81 50.79 60.94 
23 7.09 8.61 0.03 6.40 37.78 7.74 88.38 
24 23.69 1.71 2.83 1.44 39.26 5.83 33.67 
25 1.08 0.86 2.77 6.38 18.95 5.04 56.50 
26 5.25 0.24 0.02 0.33 13.07 2.04 10.77 
27 11.91 3.25 0.82 0.16 0.72 7.56 19.67 
28 3.71 1.03 0.00 0.65 0.36 2.00 3.48 
29 * 3.04 1.62 4.85 2.58 1.33 0.12 
30 * 3.76 1.08 3.70 24.40 0.06 15.60 
Notes: χ2(1,.05) = 3.84.  * Two test statistics are not reported because the denominator in the test statistic 
formula equals zero 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Actual & Simulated Mean Log-wages 
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compared to those observed in the data. The results of this exercise are presented in Figures 1-2
and Tables 3-5. Table 5 shows the means and standard deviations of accepted log wages in the
NLSY and simulated data. The discrepancies between simulated and actual mean log wages range
from :01 to :08 across occupations, and the model matches the standard deviations of wages in
each occupation even more closely. The model ts the observed wage distribution quite well. In
addition, Figure 1 shows that the model is able to match the age prole of wages extremely closely.
The model captures the general upward trend in mean wages and the sharp increase in mean wages
that occurs at college graduation quite precisely.
Tables 3 and 4 show how well the model ts the patterns of occupational mobility found in the
NLSY data. In Tables 3 and 4 the top entry in each cell is computed using the NLSY data, and the
bottom entry is computed using the simulated data. Table 3 shows that the model is able to match
the rates of inter-rm and intra-rm occupational mobility extremely well. The model captures the
fact that inter-rm occupational switching is more common that intra-rm occupational switching,
and the model also matches the sharper downward age trend in intra-rm occupational mobility.
Table 4 shows that the model is also able to closely match the occupational transition matrix found
in the NLSY data, so the model generates patterns in occupational mobility that are quite similar
to those found in the NLSY. The diagonal elements of Table 4 show that overall, the model tends to
slightly overstate persistence in occupational choices, but in general the models t to occupational
mobility is quite good. The average years of rm and occupation tenure are 2:2 and 2:4 in the
NLSY sample, while the corresponding averages in the simulated data are 2:5 and 2:6 years.
Figure 2 depicts the choice proportions disaggregated by age for both the NLSY data and
simulated data. The model qualitatively ts the choices observed in the data quite well, in most
cases closely tracking both the levels of the choice proportions found in the NLSY data as well as the
age trends. The model closely matches the sharp upward age trend in professional and managerial
employment found in the NLSY data, and the model also matches the more gradual increase in
27
 
Figure 2 
Choice Proportions by Age: Actual and Simulated Data 
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craftsmen employment with age. The model also captures the relatively at age patterns in the
operatives and service occupations. The model tracks the downward age trend in school attendance
extremely closely. The average person in the simulated data completes 3:43 years of high school and
1:25 years of college, while the corresponding averages in the NLSY sample are 3:39 years of high
school and 1:33 years of college. The simulated data reproduces the general qualitative age pattern
in unemployment found in the NLSY data, although the model under predicts the unemployment
rate in the early to mid twenties. The model also overstates employment in the sales and clerical
occupation during the mid twenties.
More formal evidence on the t of the model is presented in Table 6, which shows 2 goodness-
of-t test statistics for the choice proportions disaggregated by age. The test statistics conrm the
impressions of the graphs: the model generates choice patterns that are in many cases statistically
di¤erent from those found in the actual data, but there are also many cells in the table where the
t of the model is not rejected.18 Overall, a comparison of the actual and simulated data shows
that a model that combines features of a job search model and human capital occupational choice
model is able to t the wage distribution extremely well, and is also able to match many of the
patterns in occupational and educational choices.
5.2 The Log Wage Equation: Human Capital & Job Search
The estimates of the log wage equation parameters found in Table 7, Panel A reveal the impor-
tance of education and occupation and rm specic human capital in determining wages in each
occupation. The e¤ects of high school and college on wages vary widely across the ve occupations,
which suggests that the types of skills produced by high school and college education are valued dif-
ferently across occupations. The percent change in wages resulting from completing an additional
year of high school ranges from a low of 1:4% for craftsmen to a high of 5:6% for operatives and
18 It should be noted that in most specication tests of dynamic structural models the t of the model is rejected
by formal 2 goodness-of-t tests. See, for example, Brien, Lillard, and Stern (2006), or Eckstein and Wolpin (1999).
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Table 7: Panel A 
 Structural Model Estimates 
 
                          Occupations 
Variable Professional 
& managers 
Craftsmen Operatives & 
laborers 
Sales & 
clerical 
Service 
Log Wage Equation:      
Age (β1) -.0189 
(.0109) 
.0980 
(.0114) 
.0030 
(.0081) 
.0363 
(.0154) 
-.0101 
(.0098) 
Age2/100 (β2) .0850 
(.0462) 
-.4059 
(.0503) 
.0357 
(.0370) 
-.0372 
(.0706) 
.2056 
(.0511) 
Years of high school (β3) .0479 
(.0160) 
.0138 
(.0111) 
.0562 
(.0093) 
.0290 
(.0202) 
.0213 
(.0120) 
Years of college (β4) .0924 
(.0066) 
.0472 
(.0080) 
.0320 
(.0081) 
.0721 
(.0049) 
.1026 
(.0088) 
Age ≤ 17 (β5) -.2716 
(.0664) 
-.0686 
(.0579) 
-.1956 
(.0328) 
-.1798 
(.0548) 
-.0316 
(.0365) 
18 ≤ Age ≤ 21 (β6) -.2700 
(.0216) 
-.0359 
(.0195) 
-.1615 
(.0148) 
-.1942 
(.0209) 
-.0417 
(.0178) 
GED (β7) .0208 
(.0368) 
.0010 
(.0471) 
.0558 
(.0417) 
.0210 
(.0425) 
.0110 
(.0365) 
Firm-specific HC: level  1 (β8) .0000& 
 
.0000&
 
.0000&
 
.0000&
 
.0000&
 
Firm-specific HC: level 2 (β9) .1195 
(.0121) 
.0410 
(.0151) 
.0445 
(.0115) 
.0807 
(.0142) 
.1568 
(.0227) 
Firm-specific HC: level 3 (β10) .1790 
(.0112) 
.1095 
(.0152) 
.0970 
(.0150) 
.1236 
(.0203) 
.2545 
(.0213) 
Occupation-specific HC: level 1 (β11) .0000& 
 
.0000& 
 
.0000& 
 
.0000& 
 
.0000& 
 
Occupation-specific HC: level 2 (β12) .0240 
(.0197) 
.0921 
(.0161) 
.0000 
(---) 
.0000 
(---) 
.0462 
(.0146) 
Occupation-specific HC: level 3 (β13) .1715 
(.0179) 
.1296 
(.0260) 
.0000 
(---) 
.0000 
(---) 
.0462 
(.0146) 
Probability that firm-specific human 
capital increases (λf) 
.9999 
(---) 
.9999 
(---) 
.9999 
(---) 
.9999 
(---) 
.9999 
(---) 
Probability that occupation-specific 
human capital increases (λf) 
.7774 
(.0609) 
.4629 
(.0179) 
.9999 
(---) 
.1892 
(.0396) 
.99999 
(---) 
Error Standard Deviations Estimate Stan. Error    
True randomness in wages (σe) .3085 0.0013    
Non-Pecuniary firm match value (σξ) .0000 ---    
Pecuniary firm match value (σψ) .2756 0.0043    
Extreme value parameter (τ) 3.2932 0.1892    
Log-likelihood -15,252     
Notes:  & indicates the parameter is fixed at the stated value and not estimated because it is not identified. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. (---) denotes parameters which were fixed during estimation at the stated value, so standard errors are not reported. 
Age is measured as true age minus 15.  
 
 
 
 
 
laborers. Interestingly, the null hypothesis that the e¤ect of completing a year of high school has
no e¤ect on wages is not rejected at the 5% level for the craftsmen, sales and clerical, and service
occupations. The monetary return to attending college also varies widely across occupations, and
is statistically di¤erent from zero in all occupations. Completing a year of college increases wages
by approximately 9:2% for professional and managerial workers, while a year of college increases
wages by only 3:2% for an operative or laborer. The relationship between education and wages is
convex in four out of the ve occupations, with only operatives and laborers realizing a lower wage
gain from college education than high school education.
The nding that the wage function is convex in schooling di¤ers from the results of most studies
of the relationship between schooling and wages which typically assume linearity (Card 1999). A
notable exception is Belzil and Hansen (2002) who also nd a convex schooling-wage function based
on their estimates of a dynamic programming model of schooling and employment choices. In the
present model, the average return per year of education from grade ten to sixteen is 7:3% for
professional and managerial workers, 3:2% for craftsmen, 4:2% for operatives and laborers, 5:4%
for sales and clerical workers, and 6:7% for service workers. These results are consistent with the
relatively low average return to schooling of 7% per year reported by Belzil and Hansen (2002),
given that they do not allow the returns to schooling to vary by occupation.19 The results also
support the ndings of Manski and Pepper (2000), who question the validity of the extremely high
returns to schooling obtained in many studies that use instrumental variables techniques.20
The point estimate of the e¤ect of a GED on wages ranges from :10% to 5:6% across the ve
occupations, although the e¤ect is not statistically di¤erent from zero in any occupation. These
19The model estimated by Belzil and Hansen (2002) (B&H) shares the basic methodology used in this study, as both
studies estimate a dynamic programming model of education and earnings, but there are many di¤erences between
the models. A few of the larger di¤erences are: 1)B&H focus on education so they do not model occupational choices,
2) school interuption is exogenous in B&H, while it is endogenous in the present model, 3) B&H abstract away from
rm and occupation specic capital and job matching since their focus is on education, 4) B&H use a more exible
spline function specication of the returns to education.
20Manski and Pepper (2000) use a monotone IV assumption to determine that the upper bound on the increase
in log-wages from completing four years of college is .39. In this paper, the estimated returns to completing college
range from .37 for professionals and managers to .13 for operatives and laborers.
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results are consistent with those of Cameron and Heckman (1993), who nd that the GED does not
have a positive e¤ect on wages using a regression which assumes that earning a GED is exogenous.
At the other extreme, Tyler, Murnane, and Willett (2000) use a natural experiment approach based
on variation in the GED passing standard across states to determine that the GED increases wage
by 10  19%.
The estimates of the rm and occupation specic human capital parameters are presented in
the bottom half of Table 7, Panel A. These parameters measure the change in log wages accruing
to workers as their rm specic capital increases. For example, moving to the second rm specic
human capital level increases a professionals wage by approximately 12%, and moving to the third
level results in an additional increase of 5:9%. The relationship between rm specic capital and
wages is concave for professionals, sales, and service workers, and convex for craftsmen (level 2:
4:1%, level 3: 10:9%). The importance of rm specic capital varies widely across occupations,
with operatives and laborers realizing the lowest wage increases with rm tenure (9:7% at level
3), and service workers realizing the largest gains (25:4% at level 3). Across all occupations the
probability of rm specic skill increase is essentially equal to one, so wages increase quickly with
rm tenure for two years before levelling out.21 During estimation these probabilities converged to
numbers that were essentially equal to one, so these parameters were xed at the stated value during
estimation. For this reason, bootstrapped standard errors are not reported for these parameters.
The importance of occupation specic capital varies widely across occupations. Both operatives
and laborers and sales and clerical workers realize essentially no gain from occupation specic
capital, and service workers realize a relatively modest gain of 4:6% when their occupation specic
skills reach the highest level. In contrast, professional and managerial workers realize a wage gain
of 17% at the third level occupation specic capital, while craftsmen experience a wage gain of 13%
21Rapid wage growth with rm tenure early in jobs that subsides at higher levels of tenure has been found in
several studies. For example, Altonji and Shakotko (1987) nd that the rst year of tenure increases wages by 11%.
Dustman and Meghir (2005) report returns to rm tenure for unskilled German workers of 4% per year during the
rst 5 years of tenure, but the returns are zero for higher levels of tenure.
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at the third level. The relationship between wages and occupation specic capital is convex for
professionals and managers, since moving to the second occupation specic capital level increases
wages by only 2:4%, while moving to the third level increases wages by nearly an additional 15%.
In contrast, craftsmen realize a large wage gain of 9:2% when moving to the second occupation
specic capital level, but moving to the next level increases wages by only an additional 3:7%. In
addition, the probability of occupation specic skill increase is substantially lower for craftsmen
compared to professionals (:46 vs. :77).
One important consideration is the extent to which the discrete levels of rm and occupation
specic human capital are able to capture the patterns in wage growth found in the NLSY. Most
of the skill increase probabilities are very close to one, with the exception of the rates of increase
for professional and craftsmen occupation specic human capital. When skill increase probabilities
are close to one, wages will increase early in jobs but the highest level of human capital will be
reached quickly. The concern is that the discrete levels approach will understate on-the-job wage
growth. Unfortunately, keeping track of years of human capital is not feasible given that the state
space of the model is already very large. One way of addressing this concern is by comparing OLS
estimates of a quadratic specication of a simple wage equation to one that uses three discrete
levels to capture the e¤ects of rm and occupation specic human capital. These specications
of the wage equation provide virtually the same t to the data, with R2(quadratic) = :3063 and
R2(levels) = :3007, and both specications contain the same number of parameters. It appears
that modelling human capital using a discrete number of human capital levels performs extremely
well relative to the commonly estimated quadratic functional form, and does not lead to a serious
underestimate of the importance of rm and occupation specic human capital.22
The estimates of the standard deviations of the random wage shock (e) and pecuniary job
22 It is important to remember that this analysis focuses on young men at the start of their career (ages 16-30), so
average rm tenure and occupation tenure are only 2.2 and 2.4 years. Given this feature of the data, it is perhaps
not surprising that the discrete levels approach performs so well.
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match value ( ) show that both job matching and random wage shocks play an important role in
determining wages, and suggest that mobility between rms provides the opportunity for substantial
wage increases. Table 8 quanties the monetary gains to job search (moving to a higher  ij)
relative to the gains from rm and occupation specic human capital accumulation. The rst
row of Table 8 shows the percent increase in wages in each occupation accruing to a worker who
reaches the highest levels of both rm and occupation specic human capital, while the bottom
row depicts the wage gains from moving to higher percentiles of the job match distribution. The
potential wage increase from the combination of rm and occupation specic capital varies widely
across occupations, ranging from a low of 10% for operatives and laborers to a high of 42% for
professionals and managers. There are also substantial gains to job search: a worker who is able
to move from the 25th to 75th percentile of the match value distribution realizes a wage gain from
job search of 45% (exp(:186   [ :186])   1 = :45), while a worker moving from the 5th to 95th
percentile experiences a wage increase of 147%. These results indicate that both human capital
accumulation and job search play important roles in determining wage growth over the career, but
the relative importance of each e¤ect varies by occupation. The primary source of wage growth for
operatives and laborers and sales and clerical workers is nding a good rm match, while in the
other occupations the wage gains from human capital accumulation are quite large relative to the
potential gains from job search.
5.2.1 Wage Equation Specication Tests
Due to computational constraints, this work does not attempt to estimate the extent to which
human capital accumulated in one occupation is transferable to other occupations. Also, age
e¤ects are included in the wage equation instead of total work experience. While it is conceptually
straightforward to add variables to the state space that track previous occupational experience
and total work experience, in practice these additions would render an already di¢ cult estimation
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Table 8 
 Combined Returns to Firm & Occupation-Specific Capital vs. Gains from Job Search 
 Professional 
& Managers 
Craftsmen Operatives & 
Laborers 
Sales & 
Clerical 
Service 
Potential cumulative wage 
increase from firm & 
occupation-specific capital 
42% 27% 10% 13% 34% 
Potential wage gains from 
job search 
     
25th percentile match to 
75th 45% 
    
5th percentile match to 95th 147%     
Notes: Gains to firm and occupation-specific human capital are computed using the human capital level parameter estimates 
(potential wage increase = exp(firm HC level 3+ occ. HC level 3)-1). Gains to job search are based on the percentiles of the 
pecuniary job match value (ψ) distribution. 
 
Table 9 
ρ(z) Test Statistics and p-values 
  Explanatory Variable (z)
Occupation Total Experience 
Professional & 
managerial 
experience 
Craftsmen 
experience 
Operatives & 
laborers 
experience 
Sales & 
clerical 
experience 
Service 
experience 
Professional 
& managers 
3.139 
(.002) --- 
2.653 
(.008) 
1.126 
(.260) 
2.049 
(.040) 
2.440 
(.015) 
Craftsmen 2.838 (.005) 
.472 
(.637) --- 
3.598 
(.000) 
.409 
(.682) 
.528 
(.598) 
Operatives & 
laborers 
4.589 
(.000) 
.433 
(.665) 
4.358 
(.000) --- 
.484 
(.628) 
1.431 
(.152) 
Sales & 
clerical 
1.182 
(.237) 
.745 
(.456) 
.275 
(.783) 
.293 
(.769) --- 
-.447 
(1.345) 
Service .158 (.874) 
.293 
(.769) 
.790 
(.430) 
.887 
(.375) 
.753 
(.451) --- 
Notes: Entries are test statistics for H0: E(eitzit)=0 vs. the two sided alternative. p-values in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
problem infeasible.23 Although it is not possible to estimate a more general model that includes
these additional state variables, one can still investigate their importance using hypothesis tests
that do not require estimating multiple specications of the model.
Dene beit as a wage residual generated from the model. The goal is to construct a test statistic
the measures whether the residuals are correlated with a variable, zit, that is not included in the
state space. For example, zit could be the amount of laborer experience that a craftsman has
accumulated, or a workers total amount of labor market experience. Consider testing the null
hypothesis of H0 : E(beitzit) = 0 against HA : E(beitzit) 6= 0. Let
(z) =
1p
N
X
i
1eTi
P
t beitzitq
1
N
X
i
( 1eTi
P
t beitzit)2   ( 1N Xi 1eTi Pt beitjzit)2 : (19)
Under H0, (z) v N(0; 1). Using this approach, one can investigate the importance of additional
state variables by estimating one model, generating residuals, and then measuring the correlations
of these residuals with the relevant variables.
The (z) test statistics for the signicance of cross-occupation experience e¤ects and general
experience e¤ects in each occupation are presented in Table 9. With only one exception the test
statistics are positive, so as one would expect wage residuals tend to be positively correlated with
these additional experience variables. The rst column of Table 9 shows that the null hypothesis
of no correlation between total experience and residuals is rejected at conventional levels for the
professional, craftsmen, and operatives occupations. However, the null hypothesis is not rejected
for the sales and clerical and service occupations.
There is considerable heterogeneity across occupations in the test statistics for cross-occupation
experience e¤ects. The rst row of Table 9 shows that in the professional and managerial oc-
cupation, prior experience accumulated in the craftsmen, sales and clerical, and service occu-
pations is fairly strongly correlated with wage residuals. These results support the idea that
23The state space for this model is on the order of 100,000,000 elements. Keeping track of additional state variables
such as experience in past occupations or total years of work experience creates a state space that is too large to be
handled on the parallel computing cluster used for estimation.
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when someone becomes a manager, the skills acquired in previous occupations retain some value.
Similarly, experience gained as an operative is strongly correlated with craftsmen wage residuals
((z) = 3:589), and a similar relationship holds between craftsmen experience and operative wage
residuals ((z) = 4:358). Turning to the remaining two occupations, the bottom two rows of Table
9 show that there is little evidence that cross-occupation experience e¤ects are important in the
sales and clerical and service occupations.
The (z) test statistics provide evidence that in the majority of cases, the career choice model
presented in this paper is not missing important cross-occupation experience e¤ects. However,
the test statistics suggest that future research could benet from allowing for a limited number
of cross-occupation experience e¤ects. For example, allowing for these e¤ects in the professional
wage equation, and between the closely related craftsmen and operative occupations appears to be
desirable. In addition, the results suggest that allowing for total experience e¤ects in addition to
age e¤ects would be a useful advance.
5.3 Career Choices & Heterogeneity in Skills and Preferences
Table 7, Panel B presents the estimates of the log-wage equation intercepts (s) and non-pecuniary
utility ow intercepts (s) for each of the four types of people in the model, along with the estimated
proportion of each type in the population.
The log wage intercepts represent skill endowments in each of the ve occupations. The esti-
mates of the wage intercepts show that there is substantial variation in market ability both across
and within types. Type 1s have the highest ability in each occupation, while type 2s have ap-
proximately the second highest ability in all occupations except service. Di¤erences in the log wage
intercepts correspond approximately to percentage changes in wages, so a persons endowment type
greatly inuences their expected earnings in each occupation. For example, holding the e¤ects of all
state variables constant, a type 1 persons expected wage in the sales and clerical occupation is ap-
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Table 7: Panel B 
Structural Model Estimates 
Variable Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4 
Log-wage Intercepts     
Professional & managerial (μ1) 9.6763 
(.0573) 
9.2385 
(.0526) 
8.9752 
(.0552) 
9.0094 
(.0610) 
Craftsmen (μ2) 9.1097 
(.0752) 
8.8784 
(.0817) 
8.6602 
(.0752) 
8.7294 
(.0819) 
Operatives & laborers (μ3) 9.3466 
(.0507) 
9.0036 
(.0465) 
8.9910 
(.0461) 
8.8197 
(.0491) 
Sales & clerical (μ4) 9.3183 
(.1104) 
8.9468 
(.1098) 
8.8719 
(.1119) 
8.7615 
(.1126) 
Service (μ5) 9.1572 
(.0627) 
8.8421 
(.0679) 
8.8364 
(.0575) 
8.8536 
(.0681) 
Non-pecuniary Intercepts     
Professional & managerial (φ1) -28.3483 
(1.5988) 
-25.3429 
(1.3460) 
-27.5605 
(1.5520) 
-37.2085 
(2.0556) 
Craftsmen (φ2) -21.3324 
(.9998) 
-23.8235 
(1.1400) 
-21.0037 
(.9488) 
-28.0649 
(1.3130) 
Operatives & laborers (φ3) -16.1970 
(.7932) 
-14.5400 
(.7920) 
-15.5279 
(.8272) 
-20.9043 
(1.1621) 
Sales & clerical (φ4) -22.8577 
(1.0122) 
-19.8964 
(.9691) 
-22.9990 
(1.0792) 
-26.9751 
(1.2650) 
Service (φ5) -19.3427 
(.8549) 
-16.4235 
(.7909) 
-18.8004 
(.8073) 
-23.9541 
(1.0389) 
School (φs) 6.0728 
(.6311) 
16.7752 
(1.2998) 
 
6.8479 
(.6784) 
 
7.4399 
(.7378) 
 
Type Probabilities    
Initial schooling > 9 years .3009 
(.0245) 
.3298 
(.0461) 
.3312 
(.0208) 
.0381 
(.0016) 
Initial schooling ≤ 9 years .2184 
(.0164) 
.1439 
(.0491) 
.4743 
(.0291) 
.1634 
(.0101) 
                                   Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
proximately 37% higher than a type 2s expected wage, 44% higher than a type 3s expected wage,
and 55% higher than a type 4s expected wage. Across occupations, professional and managerial
ability varies the most in the population (standard deviation=.27), while the service occupation
has the least dispersion in ability (standard deviation=.13).
The non-pecuniary intercepts (s) reect a persons preferences for working in each occupation
and attending school. These parameters are measured in log yearly wage units relative to the base
choice of unemployment. The non-wage employment intercepts are negative across all occupations
and types, which indicates that people experience disutility from employment relative to leisure.
The non-wage employment intercepts vary widely across occupations, which indicates that there is
substantial heterogeneity in preferences for employment in di¤erent occupations across people.
The preference for attending school (or school ability) represents the consumption value of
school net of the pecuniary and non-pecuniary costs of attending school. The value of attending
school varies substantially across types, from a low of 6:07 log yearly wage units for type 1s, to a
high of 16:77 for type 2s. The disaggregation of ability into market skills (s) and school ability or
preference (s) shows that the two dimensions of ability are far from perfectly positively correlated.
Type 1s have the highest market ability in each occupation but the lowest schooling ability.
Table 10 quanties the impact of heterogeneity in skills and preferences on career outcomes
by summarizing career choices for each endowment type based on simulated data generated from
the structural model. At age 21 there are already substantial di¤erences in career outcomes across
types. Approximately 75% of the highest schooling ability people, type 2s, are attending school at
age 21. In contrast, the majority of type 1 and 2s have nished attending school and are working
in blue collar occupations as craftsmen or operatives and laborers. Type 4s, who experience the
highest disutility from working and also have the lowest endowment of market ability have a 77%
unemployment rate at age 21. At age 27 types have specialized in di¤erent types of employment
as a result of variation in skills and preferences. Type 2s are essentially white collar workers,
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Table 10 
Simulated Choice Frequencies by Endowment Type 
 Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4 
Choice percentages at 
age 21 
    
Attending school 4.48% 75.54% 6.29% 12.91% 
Unemployed 12.85% 8.84% 13.41% 77.51% 
Professional & 
managerial 
6.72% 12.63% 7.66% 0.00% 
Craftsmen 22.29% 2.64% 20.62% 2.39% 
Operatives & laborers 27.95% 7.35% 30.20% 3.35% 
Sales & Clerical 11.79% 19.40% 11.13% 2.39% 
Service 16.86% 11.02% 14.78% 2.87% 
Choice percentages at 
age 27 
    
Attending school .79% 16.15% 1.71% 1.37% 
Unemployed 3.01% 2.00% 3.41% 59.59% 
Professional & 
managerial 
28.48% 56.15% 26.46% 2.74% 
Craftsmen 32.91% 1.23% 27.68% 7.53% 
Operatives & laborers 22.78% 3.08% 28.90% 13.70% 
Sales & clerical 6.49% 28.48% 4.88% 10.27% 
Service 6.33% 8.31% 8.66% 5.48% 
Value functions & 
wages at age 27 
Mean Std. 
dev. 
Mean Std. 
dev. 
Mean Std. 
dev. 
Mean Std. 
dev. 
Value function of 
optimal choice at age 27 
43.66 7.94 70.23 8.92 44.88 7.96 14.04 5.49 
Wage at age 27 9.95 .42 9.92 .42 9.45 .40 9.42 .47 
Notes: Based on a simulation of 4,000 people. Average simulated wages are conditional on employment. Value functions 
represent the discounted expected value of lifetime utility.
since 56% are employed as professionals and managers, and 28% are employed as sales and clerical
workers.
It is clear that occupational and educational choices are strongly impacted by heterogeneity
in skills and preferences, but it is not obvious how this heterogeneity a¤ects key career outcomes
such as wages, and, more importantly, total utility. The nal section of Table 10 addresses these
questions by showing the mean simulated value functions along with mean accepted wages for each
type at age 27. Di¤erences in the simulated value functions across types show how the discounted
expected value of lifetime utility is impacted by heterogeneity in ability and preferences. The
discounted expected value of lifetime utility at age 27 for a type 2 worker is approximately 1.5
times higher than a type 1 or type 3 worker, and is 5 times higher than a type 4 worker. Type 4
workers on average spend a large portion of their careers unemployed due to both low market skills
and high employment disutility.
The variation in discounted expected lifetime utility across types suggests that skill and prefer-
ence heterogeneity is an important determinant of welfare inequality. A regression of the discounted
expected value of lifetime utility on type dummy variables explains 56% of the variation in lifetime
utility across people, so heterogeneity in skills and preferences is a key determinant of welfare. One
implication of this result is that job search models that do not incorporate occupations are missing
a key determinant of welfare. The remaining 44% of variation in utility is caused by random shocks
to wages and non-pecuniary utility ows, the arrival of job matches, and randomness in human cap-
ital improvement. To put this result in context, Keane and Wolpin (1997) nd that heterogeneity
in schooling ability and market ability explains 90% of the variation in lifetime utility. The addition
of job search, rm specic capital, and random shocks to non-pecuniary utility to an occupational
choice model reduces the importance of permanent heterogeneity in determining welfare, but its
impact is still substantial.24
24 In addition to the previously stated di¤erences between Keane and Wolpin (1997) and the present model, other
key di¤erences that may impact the importance of permanent heterogeneity are the level of aggregation of civilian
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Given the importance of endowment heterogeneity in determining career choices, earnings, and
utility, it is worthwhile to investigate some of the observable family background characteristics that
may be correlated with this endowment heterogeneity. Following Keane and Wolpin (1997), Bayes
rule can be used to calculate type probabilities conditional on observed choices, wages, and initial
schooling. After computing conditional type probabilities for each individual in the sample, one
can see if these type probabilities are related to observable family background characteristics. The
rst row of Table 11 shows the baseline distribution of types and initial education in the sample
which can be compared to the conditional type distributions in the rows below. For example, the
proportion of the type with the highest discounted expected value of lifetime utility (type 2s)
is :13 for individuals whose mothers are high school dropouts, :26 for those whose mothers were
terminal high school graduates, and :39 for those whose mothers are college graduates. Column 10
of Table 11 shows that having a mother who is a college graduate instead of a high school dropout
is associated with a 19% increase in the present value of expected lifetime utility.
Household structure at age 14 is also related to endowment type. Individuals who live with
both parents at age 14 are the most likely to be of the type with the highest present value of
lifetime utility (28% type 2s), and are relatively unlikely to be of the type that tends to experience
long unemployment spells and realize low utility (6% type 4s). The number of siblings that an
individual has is also associated with lifetime utility. People with one sibling have the highest utility
(89:46), and utility declines by 4:5% for those with two siblings, declines by an additional 2% for
those with three siblings, and declines by an additional 8:5% for those with four or more siblings.
There is also a strong association between parental income and lifetime utility. An individual who
comes from a family in the top 10% of the income distribution has an expected lifetime utility ow
that is roughly 25% greater than that of an individual whos family is in the bottom 15% of the
occupations (ve compared to two in K+W), the exclusion of military employment from the present model, and the
inclusion of heterogeneity in employment preferences along with heterogeneity in ability in the present model. In
addition, it is possible that the use of a continuous match value distribution and discrete unobserved heterogeneity
distribution could tend to understate the importance of permanent heterogeneity.
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Table 7: Panel C 
Structural Model Estimates 
Variable Estimate Variable Estimate 
Discount factor (δ) .95& Switching Costs  
School Utility Flow  Firm to firm transitions (α10) -2.6056 (0.2662) 
Age (γs1) -3.6774 
(.3322) 
School re-entry (γs7) -2.3755 
(0.3023) 
Age2/100 (γs2) 9.5911 
(1.4104) 
 New job from non-employment (α9) -2.6602 
(0.2730) 
Attending college (γs3) .6566 
(.5559) 
Costs of Working while Attending School  
Attending graduate school (γs4) -2.2644 
(.6873) 
Work in high school (γsw6) 6.4962 
(0.6209) 
Years of high school (γs5) .5633 
(.1372) 
Work in college (γsw7) 11.5478 
(0.7876) 
Years of college (γs6) .4908 
(.1222) 
Work in graduate school (γsw8) 12.0925 
(0.9356) 
School While Employed Utility Flow  Within-firm Job Offer Probabilities  
Age (γsw1) -5.2685 
(.3074) 
Offer from professional & managerial (π1) 0.2470 
(0.0076) 
Age2/100 (γsw2) 24.7501 
(1.5036) 
Offer from craftsmen (π2) 0.2135 
(0.0102) 
Years of high school (γsw3) 4.1476 
(.2899) 
Offer from operatives & laborers (π3) 0.2276 
(0.0116) 
Years of college (γsw4) 1.0681 
(.1683) 
Offer from sales & clerical (π4) 0.2260 
(0.0109) 
  Offer from service (π5) 0.0859 (0.0088) 
 
 
Table 7: Panel D 
Structural Model Estimates 
            Occupations
Variable Professional 
& Managers 
Craftsmen Operatives & 
Laborers 
Sales & 
Clerical 
Service 
Employment Non-Pecuniary 
Utility Flows:
     
Age (α1) 1.9228 (.2382) 
2.0399 
(.1930) 
0.8630 
(.1441) 
1.7651 
(.1735) 
0.8648 
(.1354) 
Age2/100 (α2) -8.0192 (.9615) 
-10.0984 
(1.0237) 
-4.1053 
(.6616) 
-10.6864 
(1.0566) 
-4.0264 
(.7183) 
Education (α3) 0.8055 (.1250) 
-0.6476 
(.1168) 
-0.6172 
(.1374) 
0.2610 
(.1632) 
0.0254 
(.1182) 
Occupation-Specific HC (α4) 5.5309 (.3685) 
3.6572 
(.3046) 
2.5296 
(.2139) 
2.2231 
(.2259) 
2.0830 
(.2214) 
Firm-Specific HC (α5) 2.0292 (.1761) 
2.5211 
(.2207) 
2.0824 
(.1660) 
2.5651 
(.1695) 
2.4171 
(.2319) 
High school diploma (α6) 0.6186 (.4336) 
2.2647 
(.4096) 
1.7508 
(.3364) 
1.8624 
(.4184) 
0.7458 
(.3373) 
College diploma (α7) 2.4948 (.3322) 
4.8166 
(.6447) 
4.3202 
(.4657) 
5.1464 
(.5785) 
3.5438 
(.5592) 
GED (α8) 1.4332 (.5578) 
1.7186 
(.6797) 
2.3389 
(.4508) 
1.7298 
(.4811) 
2.9879 
(.4928) 
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses. 
income distribution in 1978.
5.4 Non-pecuniary Utility Flows
The coe¢ cients of the deterministic portions of the non-pecuniary utility ow equations are pre-
sented in Table 7, Panels C and D. The coe¢ cients are interpreted as changes in utility ows relative
to the base choice of unemployment. For example, each year of high school completed increases
the one-period utility ow from attending school by :563 relative to the value of being unemployed.
The estimates of the switching costs show that workers incur a mobility cost of approximately 2:61
when switching rms or re-entering employment from unemployment. Incurring the moving cost
has the same e¤ect on utility as a 93% decrease in wages, so these switching costs are quite large.25
The parameter estimates in Table 7, Panel D shows that the e¤ects of observable variables on
employment non-pecuniary utility vary widely across occupations. For example, each additional
year of education increases employment utility by :805 for professional and managerial workers,
but each year of education decreases employment utility by :647 for craftsmen. Employment utility
increases sharply in each occupation as workers accumulate both rm and occupation specic
capital. One interpretation of these e¤ects is that acquiring greater skills makes a job easier, which
reduces the disutility of working. The positive e¤ect of rm tenure on non-pecuniary utility may
also arise from fringe benets that increase with rm tenure.
6 Counterfactual Experiments
One of the major advantages of structural estimation relative to reduced form approaches is that
structural models can be used to conduct counterfactual simulations. This section uses the struc-
tural model to conduct counterfactual simulations that quantify the e¤ects of changes in the eco-
25See Berkovec and Stern (1991) or Lee and Wolpin (2005) for examples of other dynamic structural models with
large estimated switching costs.
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nomic environment on lifetime earnings and utility.26 The rst set of counterfactuals examines the
contributions of human capital, job matching, and occupational matching to the wages and total
utility of workers.
6.1 A Restricted Model
Before presenting the counterfactuals that quantify the importance of matching between workers
and occupations, it is useful to begin by estimating a restricted model that rules out heterogeneity
in workersoccupation specic abilities and preferences. This restriction is imposed by estimating
the model under the restriction that there is only one type of person, so all workers have iden-
tical abilities (s) and preferences (s). When the null version of the model is estimated, the
value of the likelihood function is  19; 347. The likelihood ratio test statistic for the null hypoth-
esis of homogeneity in occupation specic skills and preferences is 8; 190, so the null hypothesis
of homogeneity is rejected at any conventional signicance level. The large decrease in the likeli-
hood function when unobserved heterogeneity is eliminated shows that this feature of the model is
necessary to match occupational choices and career outcomes.
6.2 The Value of Human Capital, Job Matching, and Occupational Matching
The rst row of Table 12 shows the total log-wages earned and utility realized by workers in
4,000 simulated careers generated from the structural model. This baseline simulation is based on
the model as specied in Section 3 along with the simulated maximum likelihood parameter esti-
mates. Comparing the baseline simulation to simulations that implement counterfactual changes
in the model provides information about the e¤ects of human capital, job search, and occupational
matching on total earnings (log-wages) and the welfare of workers (total utility). The rst counter-
factual examines the impact of rm and occupation specic human capital on wages and utility by
26 It should be noted that these counterfactual simulations are partial equilibrium in nature. These simulations
quantify the e¤ect of changing various parameters on career outcomes, holding all other structural parameters in the
model constant. Also, one should keep in mind the fact that these results are based on the NLSY79 cohort of young
men used to estimate the model.
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Table 12: The Impact of Human Capital, Job Matching, and Occupational Matching on 
Welfare and Wages 
Counterfactuals Total Log-Wages Total Utility 
 
Total % Change from 
baseline 
Total % Change from 
baseline 
Baseline (estimated model) 265,321 --- 210,623 --- 
1) Eliminate effect of firm and 
occupation specific capital on 
wages 
257,860 -2.8% 205,479 -2.4% 
2) Eliminate effect of education on 
wages 255,317 -3.8% 201,413 -4.4% 
3) Workers randomly assigned to 
firms, never allowed to switch 
firms 
213,844 -19% 138,568 -34% 
4) Workers randomly assigned to 
occupations, never allowed to 
switch occupations 
 
183,030 
 
-31% 176,478 -16% 
Notes: Computed using samples of 4,000 simulated people. Total wages and utility are the sums of accepted wages and 
realized one period utility flows over people and years. See Section 6.2 of the text for a description of the restrictions 
imposed under each counterfactual. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
eliminating the wage e¤ects of these types of human capital, calculating the value functions under
this restriction, and then using the new value functions to simulate career choices. The e¤ects of
rm and occupation specic human capital on wages are eliminated by setting the following wage
equation parameters equal to zero: qj = 0; q = 1; :::; 5; j = 8; :::; 13. Eliminating the e¤ects of rm
and occupation specic capital on wages decreases total earnings by 2.8%, while the total utility
realized by workers in the simulated economy decreases by 2.4%. The counterfactuals measure the
net e¤ect of each change, which includes many o¤setting behavioral e¤ects. For example, one e¤ect
of eliminating the returns to rm and occupation specic capital is to decrease wages because this
change eliminates on the job wage growth. This e¤ect is o¤set to some degree by the fact that
eliminating on the job wage growth reduces moving costs in the form of human capital that is lost
when workers switch rms or occupations. This counterfactual produces relatively small changes
in the baseline choice distribution. The largest e¤ect is found in the proportion of years spent
unemployed, which increases by approximately one percentage point. The diagonal elements in
the baseline transition matrix shown in Table 4 all decrease by small amounts ranging from -.10
percentage points for laborers to -1.2 percentage points for service workers. The relatively small
changes in the choice distribution and transition matrix show that occupational choices are primar-
ily determined by endowments of skills and preferences, not the heterogeneity across occupations
in the e¤ects of rm and occupation specic capital on wages.
The second counterfactual quanties the impact of education on wages by showing how wages
and total utility would change if the pecuniary returns to education were eliminated. This restriction
is imposed by setting the e¤ects of high school and college education on wages equal to zero across
all occupations (q3 = 0; 
q
4 = 0; q = 1; :::; 5). The results of this counterfactual, shown in Table
12, reveal that the combined pecuniary value of high school and college education is 3.8% of
total earnings, while the total social value is 4.4% of total utility. This counterfactual simulation
captures the net e¤ect of eliminating the returns to education, where the wage losses from the
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reduction in human capital are o¤set to some extent because a decrease in the payo¤ to attending
school increases the number of years worked by the average person in the simulated sample. The
total value of education is larger than the pecuniary value because when the pecuniary return to
education is eliminated people choose to accumulate less schooling, which decreases non-pecuniary
utility because there is a consumption value to attending school and because education increases the
employment non-pecuniary utility ow in many occupations. Interestingly, eliminating the returns
to education has relatively small e¤ects on occupational choices. The simulated occupational choice
proportions all change by less than one percentage point under this counterfactual, so the di¤erential
returns to education across occupations are not a large determinant of sorting across occupations.
The third and fourth counterfactuals shown in Table 12 examine the pecuniary and total gains
to matching between workers and rms and workers and occupations. The benets to workers
resulting from job search are quantied in the third counterfactual, where workers are randomly
matched to rms and not allowed to switch rms during their career. In this world, the gains to job
search are eliminated because workers are unable to search for jobs across rms. However, workers
are free to self select into their optimal occupation. This counterfactual shows that eliminating
job search reduces total earnings by 19%. The total value of job search is even larger than the
monetary gains: eliminating job search decreases the total utility of workers by 34%. Note that
the value of job search to society dwarfs the social value of human capital. The combined total
value of education and rm and occupation specic capital is approximately one-third as large as
the value of job search (7% of total utility vs. 34%).
The value of workers self selecting into occupations (and switching occupations) is captured in
the fourth counterfactual, where each worker is randomly matched to an occupation for his entire
career. This counterfactual eliminates occupational mobility as well as self selection in occupational
choices based on abilities and preferences, but workers are free to move between rms over the course
of their career. Randomly assigning workers to occupations reduces total earnings by 31%, so there
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are substantial monetary gains to society from allowing workers to match themselves to occupations
based on their skills and preferences. The total utility gain that is attributed to workers making
optimal occupational choices and occupational mobility decisions is equal to 16% of total utility.
The counterfactual experiments presented in this section quantify the gains arising from the
mobility of workers across rms and occupations as they make optimal career decisions. Although
the parameters indicate that there are substantial pecuniary returns to occupation and rm specic
human capital, the counterfactual simulations show that job search and self selection into occupa-
tions are far more important determinants of wages and total utility. The large gains arising from
mobility between rms and occupations suggest that it is crucial to incorporate both job search and
occupational choices when studying labor market dynamics since they are both key determinants
of total earnings and overall utility.
6.3 Quantifying the Importance of Comparative Advantage
The previously discussed counterfactuals indicate that there is substantial heterogeneity in abilities
and preferences across occupations. One way of assessing the importance of comparative advantage
e¤ects is to examine how an individuals wages and career outcomes are altered when they are
forced to choose a specic occupation other than their optimal occupation. Rather than consider
all of the possible combinations of optimal and assigned occupations, this section focuses on two
counterfactual scenarios. What would happen to professionals and managers if they were forced
to work as operatives and laborers? What would happen to operatives and laborers if they were
forced to work as professionals and managers?
When all professional and managerial workers are forced to work as operatives and laborers,
the average log wage of these workers decreases by :33 from 9:78 to 9:45. Interestingly, the average
wage of a professional forced to work as a laborer (9:45) is higher than the average wage of a person
who optimally chooses to work in the laborer occupation (9:38), so professionals have an absolute
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advantage in high skill professional jobs and in low skill laborer jobs. When workers are switched
across these occupations in the opposite direction, the average wage for laborers assigned to work
as professionals decreases from 9:38 as laborers to 9:21 as professionals. Also, relative to workers
who optimally choose to work as professionals, laborers earn extremely low wages when assigned
to the professional occupation (9:21 vs. 9:78).
6.4 The Welfare Impact of Job Displacement
The structural parameter estimates highlight the importance of human capital, gains from job
search, and non-pecuniary utility in determining career outcomes and welfare. Given the impor-
tance of these e¤ects, job displacement may result in large pecuniary and non-pecuniary costs by
destroying both human capital and productive job matches. The structural model separately iden-
ties the e¤ects of wages and non-pecuniary utility in determining total utility, so the model is
well suited to quantify both the wage losses caused by displacement as well as the overall impact
on welfare. Previous research on the cost of displacement has focused on the monetary cost of job
loss, which ignores the potentially large role of non-pecuniary utility in determining welfare.
Table 13 shows the impact of job displacement at age 25 on wages and discounted expected
utility ows for workers in each occupation. The table shows that a job displacement at age 25
decreases the discounted expected value of lifetime utility by 20%  27% depending on a workers
occupation at the time of displacement, with craftsmen experiencing the largest losses, and profes-
sional workers experiencing the smallest losses. In the year following a displacement average log
wages for workers who have found a new job are between :09 and :18 lower than their expected
wages in a world where the job loss had not occurred. The negative impact of displacement on
wages dissipates over time as workers accumulate human capital and nd new job matches. Five
years after displacement (age 30), the wages of displaced workers in each occupation are approxi-
mately equal to the wages of non-displaced workers.27 Although the wage e¤ect has subsided after
27Existing evidence on the long term impact of job displacement is mixed. Jacoson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993)
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ve years, the e¤ect on total utility has not, since the average discounted expected value of lifetime
utility for a displaced worker at age 30 is still 2%  5% lower than a non-displaced worker.
6.5 The E¤ect of Eliminating the GED
The nal counterfactual experiment examines the e¤ect of eliminating the GED, holding constant all
of the other parameters in the model. When the option of earning a GED is eliminated, individuals
who would have earned a GED now complete an additional 1/4 of a year of high school, so the
direct e¤ect on educational outcomes does not appear especially large. As one might expect, there
is virtually no increase in college attendance among this population. Eliminating the GED as an
option decreases the expected discounted value of lifetime utility for these individuals by 2%, and
it actually increases average wages at age 30 by 3%. The small wage increase is driven by the
fact that eliminating the GED causes a slight increase in completed education, and in accumulated
years of rm and occupation specic human capital because both attending school and accumulating
human capital by working serve as substitutes for the value of the GED credential. Also, eliminating
the GED increases the proportion of workers in the professional occupation by three percentage
points, and decreases the percentage of people working as operatives, sales, and service workers by
approximately one percentage point each.
7 Conclusion
This paper formulates and structurally estimates a dynamic model of educational attainment,
occupational choices, and job search that incorporates self-selection in occupational and educational
choices, endogenous accumulation of rm and occupation specic human capital, and job search
based on rm level wage and non-pecuniary matching. The model integrates the dynamic human
capital occupational choice framework developed by Keane and Wolpin (1997) with the job search
approach to labor market dynamics. The benet of estimating a model that nests both of these
nd that in their non-mass layo¤ sample wages recover 5 years after displacement, but Ruhm (1991) nds evidence
of persistent earnings reductions.
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approaches to analyzing career choices is that the parameter estimates provide direct evidence
about the relative importance of features of human capital models relative to features of job search
models in explaining the determination of wages and total utility over the career.
The parameter estimates show that wages increase with both rm and occupation specic
capital, and that the human capital wage function varies widely across occupations. The potential
total wage gains from rm and occupation specic capital range from a low of 10% for operatives
and laborers to a high of 42% for professionals and managers. While the wage gains from human
capital are substantial, the estimates of the job search portion of the model indicate that mobility
to better job matches is also a key source of wage growth. In addition, heterogeneity in occupation
specic ability, school ability, and preferences for employment in di¤erent occupations is a powerful
determinant of career choices and overall welfare. This heterogeneity accounts for approximately
56% of the variation in discounted expected lifetime utility across people.
The structural model is used to conduct counterfactual simulations that quantify the contri-
butions of human capital accumulation, job search, and occupational matching to total income
and overall welfare. These simulations reveal that eliminating the pecuniary returns to rm and
occupation specic human capital would reduce wages by 2.8%, eliminating occupational matching
would reduce wages by 31%, and eliminating the gains to rm matching would reduce wages by
19%. These results indicate that the importance of labor mobility in determining wages far exceeds
the importance of human capital. Workers realize large gains as they make optimal occupational
choices and inter-rm mobility decisions, which implies that policies that promote worker mobility
by lowering mobility costs or search frictions have the potential to increase wages and welfare by
promoting the e¢ cient assignment of workers to rms and occupations.
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Appendix A: Data Aggregation
Yearly school attendance is assigned using detailed information on monthly school attendance
and grade completion. The methodology used to assign yearly school attendance consists of several
steps. First, the amount of education accumulated by each sample member over the sample period
is determined using the variable that indicates the highest grade completed as of each interview
year. Then, starting in the rst year, individuals are considered to be attending school if they
report attending school during the year and completing a grade by the next year. If this approach
fails to assign all the accumulated years of education, then the process is repeated using the weaker
requirement that the person reports completing a grade or attending school during a year. Receipt
of a GED is coded using yearly information on whether or not a person ever earned a GED.
Yearly employment status is determined using the weekly labor force record. The yearly em-
ployment activity is the activity (a specic employer or unemployment) in which the most weeks
were spent during the year. The number of weeks spent unemployed and employed full time at
each employer are counted for each decision year. Jobs consisting of less than twenty hours of work
per week are counted as time spent unemployed. The work activity in which the most weeks were
spent during the school year is coded as the yearly labor force activity. For example, suppose that
during a year a person works at rm A for 22 weeks, works at rm B for 10 weeks, and spends 20
weeks unemployed. The primary activity for this year is working at rm A, so working at rm A
is coded as the yearly activity. The yearly occupation is the one corresponding to rm A. Given
the assumption that employment is full-time, an individuals wage is converted into a yearly wage
by multiplying the hourly wage by 2,000 hours.
Transitions between rms are identied using the NLSY survey variables that indicate whether
or not a current employer is the same as an employer in the previous year. One unavoidable
consequence of the aggregation of weekly data into yearly data is that yearly data understate the
number of transitions between rms. The identication of transitions between rms is a key feature
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of the model presented in this paper, so it is important to consider the e¤ects of aggregation on
the number of transitions between rms present in the data. One way of assessing the e¤ects of
aggregation is to compare the average number of jobs that a person holds over the sample period
using di¤erent levels of aggregation. Using the weekly NLSY employment record, the average
number of jobs is 11. When the data are aggregated to half-yearly, the average number of jobs falls
to 7. Using yearly data, the average number of jobs is 6. The e¤ects of aggregation are fairly large
when moving from weekly to half-yearly data, but relatively small when moving from half-yearly
to yearly data.28
Appendix B: Model Solution
B1: Simulating Emax. The Emax integrals do not have closed form solutions, so they are
approximated using simulation methods. At this point it is useful to partition the vector of error
terms, excluding ", into two sets. Let 
t = f ; ; eg be the set of errors whose future realizations
are unknown to the agent at time t; and dene the joint density of these errors as f(
t). Recall
that the vector of skill endowments and preferences is i = f1i ; :::; 5i ; 1i ; :::; 5i ; si ; ui g. Consider
calculating the expected value of the best choice available next period for a person who is employed
in the current time period. Conditional on 
t and rm and occupation specic human capital (fct
and oct), the expected value of the maximum has a closed form solution because of the assumption
that " is distributed extreme value,
E max
dt2Dt
f V (dt) + " j 
t;i; oct; fctg = ( + ln[
P
dt2Dt
exp(
V (dt j 
t;i; oct; fct)

)]) (20)
= 	(dt j
t;i; oct; fct) ;
where V (dt) = V (dt)  ",  is Eulers constant, and  is a parameter of the extreme value distribu-
tion. Let f() represent the density of the variable in parentheses. Integrating over the distributions
of 
t, fct and oct provides the unconditional expected value of the best choice available next period
28Hall (1982) provides a basis for comparison, reporting that workers, on average, hold 10 jobs over the course of
their careers. Similarly, Topel and Ward (1992) nd that workers hold 7 jobs in the rst 10 years of their careers.
47
for each endowment type,
E max
dt2Dt
f V (dt)+" jig =
Z Z Z
  
Z
	(dt j
t;i; oct; fct)f(
t)d
t

f(fct)dfctf(oct)doct: (21)
This integral does not have an analytical solution, so it is simulated using R draws from the
joint density f(
t). In this work, R = 40.29 The integral over the distribution of human capital
is simply a probability weighted sum because the distribution of human capital is discrete. Let r
index simulation draws, and the simulated integral is simply the average of equation 21 over the R
draws,
E max
dt2Dt
f V (dt) + "j ig = 1
R
RX
r=1
PX
h=1
Pr[fct = fct(h) j fct 1]
PX
z=1
Pr[oct = oct(z) j oct 1]
	(dt j
rt ;i; oczt ; fcht ): (22)
The other Emax terms found in the value function calculations are also approximated using this
method.
B2: Interpolation. As in Keane and Wolpin (1994), value functions are simulated at a fraction
of the state space and interpolated using a regression at the remaining points in the state space.
This paper implements a new regression function that takes advantage of the assumption that the
error term " is distributed extreme value. If the only source of randomness in the model was the
error term ", then the expected value of the maximum would have the closed form solution shown
in equation 20. This is not the case in this model due to the existence of the wage match values ( ),
non-wage match values (), and random wage shocks (e), but it suggests the following functional
form for the interpolating regression,
E max
dt2Dt
f V (dt) + " g = !0t + !1t( + ln[
P
dt2Dt
exp(
V (dt )

)]) (23)
= !0t + !1t	(dt) :
29Antithetic acceleration is used throughout estimation to reduce variance of the simulated integrals. See Geweke
(1988) for a discussion of antithetic acceleration, and Stern (1997) for a review of the applications of simulation
methods in the economics literature.
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The parameters !0t and !1t are estimated by OLS, and allowed to vary over time. During estima-
tion, the value functions are simulated at approximately 1% of the state space and interpolated at
the remaining points. The regression function ts the data very well. Throughout estimation, the
R2 from the interpolating regression remained between :95 and :99: Experimentation shows that
the actual and interpolated value functions di¤er by approximately 1% on average.
Appendix C: Evaluating the Likelihood Function
C1: Simulation of the Likelihood Function.The high dimensional integrals in the likelihood
function are simulated using R draws from the joint distribution of 
 and Q draws from the joint
distribution of occupation and rm specic human capital. The integral over the joint distribution
of human capital is simulated using a modied Geweke, Keane, and Hajivassiliou (GHK) algorithm
because the joint distribution of human capital is intractably complex. The type-specic simulated
likelihood contribution is
LSi ( j i = k) =
1
R
RX
r=1
1
Q
QX
q=1
eTiY
t=1
Pr[Orqit j
ri ; ocq; fcq;; Sit;i = k): (24)
C2: Simulation of the Likelihood Function. With the exception of the integral over the
distributions of rm and occupation specic human capital, all integrals are simulated using simple
frequency simulators. This type of simulator is not practical in the case of the integral over fc
and oc because the distributions of these unobserved state variables are intractably complex. The
integral that needs to be evaluated is the path probability over the sample period, denoted  . The
equation for this probability is
  =
Z Z eTiY
t=1
Pr[Oit j; Sit;i = k; oc; fc]dF (oc)dF (fc):
Note that the integral is over the joint distribution of fc and oc over the entire eTi years that person
i remains in the sample. Human capital evolves randomly conditional on career choices, so there
are an enormous number of possible sequences of human capital that could occur. Calculating
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this distribution for each sample person is not practical. The solution is to use a modied GHK
algorithm to simulate the integral. The intuition behind this method is the same as in Brien,
Lillard, and Stern (2006). The complete algorithm is outlined below.
1. Draw ocrt j ocrt 1 and fcrt j fcrt 1:
2. Compute Pr[Oit j ocrt ; fcrt ]:
3. Compute  r =  r  Pr[Oit j ocrt ; fcrt ]:
4. If t = eTi, go to step 5. Otherwise, set t = t+ 1 and go to step 1.
5. Repeat these steps for each of the R simulation draws. The simulated path probability is
  = 1R
PR
r=1  
r.
This algorithm simplies the problem because drawing fc and oc conditional on the previous
draw is very straightforward, while drawing from the complete distribution would be very
di¢ cult.
C3: Outcome Probabilities. The most straightforward outcome probability found in the
likelihood function is the probability of observing a person attending school or being unemployed.
In order to make things concrete, consider the likelihood contribution for a person attending school
in time t who was not employed in period t 1. The likelihood contribution is simply the probability
that the value of attending school exceeds the value of any other choice in the persons choice set,
Dnet . A consequence of the assumption that " is distributed extreme value is that conditional
on the other error terms (
), endowment vector (i), and occupation and rm specic human
capital (oc and fc), the choice probability is of the multinomial logit form,
Pr(dit = s j
; oc; fc;; Sit;i) = exp(Vt(s))P
k2Dnet
exp(Vt(k))
. (25)
50
The numerator contains the value of attending school in period t, and the denominator contains the
value functions for each of the feasible choices at time t. Computing the unconditional likelihood
contribution requires integrating over the distributions of 
, oc, and fc as discussed previously.
The probabilities for outcomes involving employment are similar to the non-employed outcome
probabilities, except the choice probability is conditioned on the observed wage and multiplied by
the wage density.
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